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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Appellate jurisdiction is an area of the law rarely given much thought by courts 
and trial practitioners.  This is not surprising.  Only a fraction of the lawsuits filed 
each year are fully litigated and an even smaller percentage of those are ever 
appealed.  Judges and practitioners therefore spend more time mastering 
jurisdictional and procedural requirements for trial courts than they do for appellate 
courts.  Nevertheless, when appellate review of a trial court judgment is sought, 
counsel must have a working knowledge of the rules governing the power of courts 
of appeals to hear a case.  Fortunately, there are just two jurisdictional requirements 
to be met in Ohio before the judgment of a trial court can be reviewed in an appellate 
court.  The first is that the judgment being appealed is a final, appealable order and 
the second is that the notice of appeal from that judgment is filed within the time 
frame prescribed by Ohio R. App. P. 4.2  This article addresses the first of these two 
requirements - the so-called “final order rule.”  
The Ohio Constitution specifies that the state’s twelve district courts of appeals 
shall have appellate jurisdiction, as provided by law, to review and affirm, modify or 
reverse “final orders” of inferior courts within their district.3  This sounds simple 
enough but the Constitution does not specify what constitutes a “final order” and 
determining whether an order is “final” oftentimes involves the use of arcane and 
convoluted rules which make the whole process seem, at best, esoteric and, at worst, 
pointlessly hyper-technical.  Be that as it may, the question of an order’s finality  is 
critically important.  If a judgment is not final, or if it is final but does not comply 
with applicable procedural rules, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review it 
and the appeal must be dismissed.4  This is so even when parties to the appeal do not 
raise the issue themselves.5  Thus, practitioners who mistakenly believe an order is 
                                                                
2Parties generally have a thirty (30) day window of opportunity to file a notice of appeal 
after the trial court enters judgment.  Ohio R. App. P. 4(A).  This time frame is mandatory and 
jurisdictional.  See State, ex rel. Boardwalk Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County, 564 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ohio 1990); Kaplysh v. Takieddine, 519 N.E.2d 382, at 
paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1988); Moldovan v. Cuyahoga County Welfare Dep’t., 
496 N.E.2d 466, 467 (Ohio 1986).  There are, however, several exceptions.  See, e.g., Ohio R. 
App. P. 4(B)(2) (tolling commencement of the thirty day time limit in certain instances), Ohio 
R. App. P. 4(B)(4) (mandating that criminal appeals by prosecutors pursuant to Crim. R. 12(k) 
or Ohio R. Juv. P. 22(F) be filed within seven days) and Ohio R. App. P. 5 (allowing criminal 
defendants to file motions seeking delayed appeal). 
3Ohio Const. art. IV, § 3(B)(2).  The term “appellate jurisdiction” is used in contrast to the 
courts’ original jurisdiction over the writs of quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, 
prohibition and procedendo.  Id. at (B)(1)(a)-(e). 
4Davison v. Rini, 686 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Prod. Credit Assn. v. 
Hedges, 621 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Kouns v. Pemberton, 617 N.E.2d 
701, 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
5Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, see Weathersfield Twp. v. Trumbull County 
Budget Comm’n, 632 N.E.2d 1281, 1282 (Ohio 1994); Shawnee Twp. v. Allen County Budget 
Comm’n, 567 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (Ohio 1991); Painesville v. Lake County Budget. Comm’n, 
383 N.E.2d 896, 898 (Ohio 1978), and a lack of such jurisdiction can be raised any time 
during the course of the proceedings including for the first time on appeal.  See Fox v. Eaton 
Corp., 358 N.E.2d 536, 537 (Ohio 1976) overruled on other grounds by Manning v. Ohio 
State Library Bd., 577 N.E.2d 650 (Ohio 1991); Jenkins v. Keller, 216 N.E.2d 379, at 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/4
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final and appealable waste time and their client’s money by filing an appeal that will 
ultimately be dismissed.  Conversely, if the judgment is erroneously thought not to 
be final, counsel may be left open to potential malpractice liability for failing to file 
an appropriate notice of appeal and preserving the rights of the client.6  
The criteria for determining whether an order is final and appealable are set out 
in Section 2502.02 of the Ohio Revised Code and, where applicable, Ohio R. Civ. P. 
54(B).  However, the interpretation and application of these rules have been uneven 
at best.  Appellate procedure is a branch of law where simplicity, clarity and 
consistency are particularly important.7  Unfortunately, over the years, the Ohio 
Supreme Court has fallen far short of those ideals and its jurisprudence in this area 
has been anything but clear and consistent.  One appellate judge laments that, 
whenever the final order issue rears “its ugly head,” the Supreme Court unleashes 
upon the legal community “such a poignant pendulum of vacillation” that he is left 
“utterly and confoundedly confused.”8  If the number of appeals being dismissed for 
lack of a final order are any indication, so too are many attorneys and trial court 
judges.9 
This article focuses on the rules for determining finality and appealability of 
judgments under section 2505.02 and Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B).  To that end, this article 
addresses not only the various categories of “final orders” but also the procedural 
mechanisms by which interlocutory appeals are taken from judgments on one part of 
a case while the rest of the case remains pending.  The objective of this article is 
two-fold.  First and foremost, it provides a resource and guide to appellate 
practitioners and trial court judges for understanding the “final order rule” and for 
navigating its various provisions in the courts of appeals.  The second objective is to 
address some of the theoretical problems and inconsistencies underlying the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area and, where possible, to suggest a more 
consistent approach to adjudicating whether a judgment is final and appealable.  The 
process for determining finality and appealability is much more complex and 
convoluted than it needs to be and the goal of this article is to contribute to the 
                                                          
paragraph five of the syllabus (Ohio 1966).  Moreover, when the parties to an appeal neglect 
to raise and brief a jurisdictional issue themselves, the appellate court is required to raise it sua 
sponte and dismiss an appeal which is not from a final appealable order.  See In re Murray, 
556 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 n.2 (Ohio 1990); Whitaker-Merrell v. Geupel Constr. Co., 280 N.E.2d 
922, 924 (Ohio 1972). 
6When in doubt, practitioners may file successive notices of appeal whenever an order 
arguably appears to be final and appealable so as to preserve the right to appeal and to protect 
them from liability.  Such practice clogs the court system even further and is a waste of 
judicial resources.  See Mark J. Chumky, Fairness and Finality: Rethinking Final Appealable 
Orders Under Ohio Law, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 143 (1995). 
7Gray v. Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co., 117 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Taft, J., concurring) (Ohio 1954) 
(emphasis in original). 
8In re Estate of Pulford, 701 N.E.2d 55, 56-57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (Ford, P.J., writing 
for a unanimous court). 
9Specific records are not kept as to the number of dismissals for jurisdictional reasons in 
general or lack of a final order in particular.  However, I have worked on innumerable cases 
over the years that have been dismissed for that very reason. 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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bench’s and the bar’s understanding of these rules and also make the process simpler 
and more consistent. 
II.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
As noted before, the Ohio Constitution vests the state courts of appeals with 
appellate jurisdiction over final orders.10  However, the Constitution does not spell 
out what constitutes a “final order.”  This is an issue left, in the first instance, to the 
General Assembly to define by statute and then to the courts as they try to interpret 
and apply those statutes.  For many years, section 2505.02 simply defined a “final 
order” as an order which fell into one of three categories: (1) an order affecting a 
substantial right which, in effect, determined the action; (2) an order affecting a 
substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application after 
judgment; and (3) an order which vacated or set aside a judgment or granted a new 
trial.11  This classification scheme provided a more or less workable standard until 
the 1980s and 1990s when several troubling cases arose concerning issues of 
privilege and confidentiality.    
One such case was Walters v. The Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc.12 
wherein two parents filed suit against a daycare center which allegedly made a false 
report of child abuse against them in retaliation for the parents having filed a 
complaint with police accusing the daycare center of leaving the children in its care 
unattended.  The parents made various discovery requests seeking, among other 
things, child abuse reports thought to be confidential.  Not surprisingly, the daycare 
center moved for a protective order, which the trial court granted in part and denied 
in part.  An immediate appeal was taken as to that portion of the order, allowing 
discovery of some of the documents.  The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals found 
that it had jurisdiction to review the case and then held that the trial court erred in 
allowing the discovery.  The case was appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which 
found that the trial court’s judgment was not a final appealable order.13  In so 
holding, the Court acknowledged that various policy concerns weighed in favor of 
making the trial court’s order immediately appealable.  The Court nevertheless 
                                                                
10Ohio Const. art. IV, § 3(B)(2).  See text at note 3. 
11The statutory antecedent for OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02 first appeared in 1935 when the 
General Assembly enacted a “simplified method of appellate review” and defined a final order 
as any order affecting a substantial right which either determined the action and prevented a 
judgment or was entered in a special proceeding or upon summary application in an action 
after judgment.  See  H.B. No. 42, 116 Ohio Laws 104, 105 (codified at former Ohio General 
Code Section 12223-2).  The third category (i.e. an order vacating or setting aside a judgment 
or ordering a new trial) was added two years later.  See Am.H.B. No. 87, 117 Ohio Laws 615.  
However, that legislation was struck down as an unconstitutional enlargement of appellate 
court jurisdiction over orders granting a new trial.  Hoffman v. Knollman, 20 N.E.2d 221, at 
paragraph four of syllabus (Ohio 1939).  The Constitution was amended, effective in 1945, 
and the General Assembly passed legislation two years later reclassifying a judgment, which  
ordered a new trial as a final order.  See H.B. No. 86, 122 Ohio Laws 754.  These categories 
were carried over when the General Code was replaced with the Ohio Revised Code in 1953 
and survived without major changes until 1998. 
12676 N.E.2d 890 (Ohio 1997). 
13Id. at 894. 
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concluded that those concerns were better addressed to the General Assembly for 
that body to “consider modifying section 2505.02.”14  Until such time as the statute 
was amended, the Court held, no appeal could be taken from the discovery order 
unless the entire case was also resolved. 
The General Assembly responded shortly thereafter with Sub.H.B. No. 394 to 
address the policy concerns and statutory interstices pointed out by the Supreme 
Court.15  This legislation amended section 2505.02 and, among other things, enlarged 
the previous three categories of final orders into the following five categories: 
“(1) An order that affects a substantial right … that in effect determines the 
action and prevents a judgment; 
(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon 
a summary application in an action after judgment; 
(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial; 
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy … 
(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a 
class action.”16 
Each of these five categories is discussed in varying degrees in this article.  As a 
practical matter, most final orders come under the first two categories - i.e. those that 
determine the action and prevent a judgment or those that are entered in a special 
proceeding - and thus they receive the most attention.17  Conversely, several 
categories are relatively self-explanatory–e.g. orders that vacate or set aside a 
judgment or grant a new trial and orders that determine whether an action can be 
maintained as a class action - and they are only briefly discussed.  Finally, this article 
delves into the new category of final orders concerning judgments that grant or deny 
a provisional remedy.  This new category was created in response to Walters and was 
meant to ameliorate the harsh results that could occur if an immediate appeal is not 
allowed on highly sensitive matters involving confidentiality, privilege, etc. 
When analyzing the various provisions of section 2505.02, as well as the other 
procedural rules affecting appealability of judgments, courts and practitioners should 
keep in mind Ohio’s strong public policy interest in avoiding “piecemeal” appeals 
during the pendency of an action.18  Ohio law favors the prompt and orderly disposal 
                                                                
14Id. at 894 n.2. 
15147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3277. 
16OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(1)-(5). 
17Of the two, orders entered in a special proceeding have proven the most problematic and 
are given the most attention herein.  It should also be noted that determining which of these 
two categories to apply is not always easy.  On several occasions, a majority of the Supreme 
Court has analyzed an order under the first category and looked at whether that order 
determined the action and prevented a judgment, see, e.g., In re Murray, 556 N.E.2d at 1171, 
Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 543 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 (Ohio 1989), only to have one or 
more Justices opine that the case should have been analyzed under the second category of the 
statute with an eye toward whether or not the order was entered in a special proceeding.  
Murray, 556 N.E.2d at 1175 (Douglas, J., concurring); Stewart, 543 N.E.2d at 1203-06 
(Douglas & Wright JJ., dissenting).  This is just another example of the high degree of 
confusion surrounding this area of the law. 
18See Denham v. New Carlisle, 716 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ohio 1999); City of Columbus v. 
Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1984). 
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of litigation19 and the entertainment of appeals from various orders made by the trial 
court during the pendency of an action does not further that policy.20  It should also 
be noted that strict application of the final order rule is not simply a convenience for 
appellate courts.  By requiring that appeals generally wait until the entire case is 
resolved, litigants are spared the time-consuming process of judgment and appeal on 
individual issues in a case and the interminable wait that such a process would cause 
for resolving the entire action.  The final order rule also preserves judicial resources, 
and thus benefits taxpayers, by requiring that a case be reviewed all at once, in a 
single appeal, rather than in numerous piecemeal appeals over time.  These 
considerations, convenience to litigants and conservation of judicial resources, 
should be the polestars by which section 2505.02 and the other procedural rules are 
interpreted and applied.  
III.  ORDERS AFFECTING A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT THAT DETERMINE AN ACTION 
The first category of final orders under section 2505.02 are those which affect a 
substantial right and, in effect, determine the action and prevent a judgment.21  These 
are the traditional types of judgments usually thought of as being final and 
appealable.  They determine the entire case, or a distinct portion thereof, such that it 
will not be necessary to bring the case back before the court for further 
proceedings.22  By definition, in order to be appealable under this category, the 
judgment must (1) affect a substantial right, (2) effectively determine the action, and 
(3) prevent a judgment.23  A brief discussion of these three criteria follows. 
A.  Substantial Rights 
Before a judgment can be deemed final and appealable under this first category 
of the statute, it must affect a substantial right.24  Prior to Sub.H.B. No. 394, there 
was no statutory definition of a “substantial right.”  Courts simply defined the 
concept as any legal right enforced and protected by law.25  In 1998, however, the 
Ohio General Assembly codified the definition of “substantial right” to mean a right 
that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, common law or 
rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.26  Practitioners will want to 
                                                                
19State, ex rel. Celebrezze v. K&S Circuits, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 653, 654 (Ohio 1983); 
Bernbaum v. Silverstein, 406 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ohio 1980). 
20Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., 68 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ohio 1946). 
21OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(1). 
22See Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., 272 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 1971); Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 
Ohio St. 511, 520 (Ohio 1853). 
23Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 709 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (Ohio 1999); State ex rel. Hughes 
v. Celeste, 619 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ohio 1993). 
24OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(1). 
25See, e.g., State ex rel. Hughes, 619 N.E.2d at 414; State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga 
Metro. Hous. Auth., 684 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ohio 1997); Noble v. Colwell, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 
1383 (Ohio 1989). 
26OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(A)(1).  One eminent treatise has noted that the statute does 
not include any express reference to rights created by municipal ordinance.  See Whiteside, 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/4
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take care to pinpoint the precise source of whatever substantial right they assert to be 
involved.  In State v. Coffman, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the Ohio Revised 
Code did not create “a legal right to shock probation” even though a statute vested 
trial courts with discretion as to whether to grant such probation.27  This would 
suggest that the legal authority for whatever right is asserted must be affirmatively 
shown and will not be assumed to exist implicitly.28 
Even if the right involved in the case is a substantial right, the order appealed 
must still affect that right in order to be deemed appealable.  An order is said to 
affect a substantial right if it is one that, if not appealable, would foreclose 
appropriate relief in the future.29  In order to successfully assert that an order affects a 
substantial right, a party must demonstrate that, in the absence of immediate review 
of the order, that party will be denied effective future relief.30  It is not enough that 
the order appealed merely restricts or limits that right.31  Rather, there must be 
virtually no opportunity in the future to provide relief from the allegedly prejudicial 
order.32 
B.  Determines the Action 
In addition to affecting a substantial right, the order must also determine the 
action.  The question of whether an order determines the action cannot be 
determined solely by the nature of the order, but must be ascertained from the effect 
that the order has on the pending case.33  An order determines the action when it 
                                                          
OHIO APPELLATE PRACTICE, § T2.11, at 48 (2003).  This is true.  However, the 1998 statutory 
amendments notwithstanding, many courts still apply the broader judicial definition of a 
substantial right.  See, e.g., Trzebuckowski, 709 N.E.2d at 1150.  The argument could also be 
made that, since ordinances are adopted by municipal corporations pursuant to statutes giving 
them legislative authority, see OHIO REV. CODE Chapter 731, the rights granted by municipal 
ordinance are derivative of statute and should be implicitly included in the statutory definition 
of a “substantial right.” 
27742 N.E.2d 644, 646 (Ohio 2001). 
28The Court’s reasoning on this issue was flawed.  While state law may not have created a 
“legal right to shock probation,” it did create an implied right to be fairly considered for such 
release.  Were it otherwise, and there was no such right, then there would be no reason to vest 
trial courts with discretion in determining whether to grant release.  Moreover, under the 
Court’s reasoning, a prisoner could be denied probation on racial or even religious grounds but 
have no recourse on appeal. 
29See Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 616 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ohio 1993). 
30See Konold v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 670 N.E.2d 574, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); 
Rhynehardt v. Sears Logistics Services, 659 N.E.2d 375, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Kelm v. 
Kelm, 639 N.E.2d 842, 845 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
31State v. Chalender, 649 N.E.2d 1254, 1255-56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
32Id. 
33State v. Eberhardt, 381 N.E.2d 1357, 1361 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Sys. Constr., Inc. v. 
Worthington Forest Ltd., 345 N.E.2d 428, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).  In some instances, 
however, the title attached to the order can be a pretty good indication of its finality.  For 
example, an interim order set to expire at a specific date by definition does not determine the 
action and prevent a judgment.  See Barker v. Barker, 693 N.E.2d 1164, 1168 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
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disposes of all the issues in the case leaving nothing for further adjudication.34  That 
is to say, the order is final in the truest sense of the word because it terminates the 
entire proceeding.  For instance, an order rejecting a magistrate’s decision and 
setting a matter for trial de novo does not “determine the action”35 nor does a 
judgment which determines liability but defers the determination of damages for 
future resolution.36  In both of these cases, there are further proceedings that must 
take place.  Neither order effectively determines the action, hence, neither order is 
appealable.  There are some exceptions, however.  In mortgage foreclosures, 
judgments determining that a mortgage constitutes the first and best lien on property, 
and ordering that such lien be foreclosed and the property sold at sheriff’s sale, is a 
final order from which an appeal should be perfected notwithstanding that a 
confirmation entry directing distribution of proceeds will be filed after sale.37 
Another way to look at this issue is to contrast judgments that determine an 
action with interlocutory orders.38  The focus of an interlocutory order is not to 
determine the rights of the parties, but to give trial courts more discretion in 
determining the manner in which litigation proceeds.39  An interlocutory ruling 
remains subject to change or modification at any time before entry of final 
judgment.40  However, after final judgment is entered, the trial court is generally 
divested of its ability to amend any interlocutory rulings41 or the final order itself.42  
                                                                
34Legg v. Fuchs, 746 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Twinsburg v. Bucky Arnes, Inc., 
No. 9677, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 11498 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1980). 
35AAA Pipe Cleaning Corp. v. Arrow Unif. Rental, Inc., No. 74215, 1999 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3381 (Ohio Ct. App. July 22, 1999). 
36Bautista v. Kolis, 754 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Jones v. White, No. 00CA644, 
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2055 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2000). 
37See, e.g., Third Nat’l Bank of Circleville v. Speakman, 480 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ohio 
1985); Oberlin Sav. Bank Co. V. Fairchild, 194 N.E.2d 580, 581 (Ohio 1963); Queen City 
Sav. & Loan Co. v. Foley, 165 N.E.2d 633, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1960). 
38Judgments are generally classified as either final or interlocutory.  See 63 OHIO JUR. 3D 
Judgments § 257 (1985).  “Interlocutory” means provisional or temporary and not final.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (5th ed. 1979). 
39See John Hunt, Determining Whether a Judicial Order is Final and Appealable Under 
Ohio Law, 58 CIN. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (1989-1990). 
40D’Agastino v. Uniroyal-Goodrich Tire Co., 717 N.E.2d 781, 785 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); 
Corradi v. Gene Norris Honda, Inc., 667 N.E.2d 416, 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
41State v. Johnson, 601 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); State v. Snedegar, No. C-
980078, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3297 (Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 1999). 
42See Harkai v. Scherba Indus., Inc., 736 N.E.2d 101, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).  Once 
final judgment is entered, all interlocutory rulings merge into the final order and become 
appealable at that time.  See also Horner v. Toledo Hosp., 640 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993); Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Perry, No. 00AP-722, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 195 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Jan. 25, 2001); Bard v. Society Nat’l Bank, No. 97APE11-1497, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 
4187 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1998). 
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C.  Prevents a Judgment 
Finally, in addition to affecting a substantial right and determining the action, the 
order in question must also prevent a judgment.  Where an order affects a complete 
resolution of all claims and issues in a case, it essentially prevents a judgment 
inconsistent therewith.43  In other words, an order prevents a judgment if it divests a 
right in such a manner as to put it beyond the power of the court making the order to 
place the parties back in their original condition.44  This may appear like nothing 
more than a mirror image of the requirement that an order determine the action.  
However, in Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski,45 the Ohio Supreme Court made clear that 
this is a completely independent criteria.  In Trzebuckowski, the city of Cleveland 
appealed a decision by the Cleveland Municipal Court dismissing a criminal case on 
the grounds that a municipal ordinance was unconstitutional.46  The judgment entry 
granting the dismissal was prepared June 22, 1995, but not journalized with the clerk 
until September 12, 1995.  The city filed its notice of appeal on August 28, 1995, but 
appellee moved to dismiss arguing that the appeal was not timely.  The Court of 
Appeals apparently denied the motion because it proceeded to address the case on its 
merits.  However, the jurisdictional argument was addressed by the Ohio Supreme 
Court, which concluded that the appeal was timely because the order was not final 
until journalized on September 12, 1995.47  The Court agreed that the Municipal 
Court decision dismissing the criminal case affected a substantial right and 
determined the action.  Until journalized, though, the entry did not prevent further 
judgment since the trial court could vacate the judgment and set the matter for trial.48  
Thus, the unjournalized judgment was not a final order and the time limit for filing a 
notice of appeal had not run.49 
D.  Examples 
A considerable body of case law has developed addressing whether certain 
judgments are final orders under section 2505.02(B)(1).  Time and space constraints 
simply do not allow for an exhaustive list and discussion of those various judgments 
                                                                
43See Sys. Constr., Inc., 345 N.E.2d at 428 (order appealed from required the parties to 
submit entire matter to arbitration thus there could be no further judgment on the complaint or 
cross-complaint); Harvey v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Cincinnati, 501 N.E.2d 39, 41 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1985) (order affected complete satisfaction of plaintiff’s cause of action and prevented 
any form of judgment in defendant’s favor); Puthoff v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 31 N.E.2d 
684, 686 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938) (test of an order’s finality is whether the court’s power to 
change the judgment has terminated). 
44Gahr v. Smith, 42 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942); Hamilton v. Temple, 19 
N.E.2d 650, 651 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938). 
45709 N.E.2d at 1148. 
46Id.  The ordinance in question apparently required billiard room operators to deny 
entrance to juveniles.  Five complaints were filed against the defendant for violating this 
ordinance.   
47Id. at 1151. 
48Id. at 1150-51. 
49Id.  See also State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed, 589 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (Ohio 1992). 
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here.50  However, I can make several general observations from my own experiences.  
First, when a case involves various parties with numerous claims, cross-claims and 
counterclaims, the parties and the courts occasionally lose track of all the claims 
involved and will let an errant claim get by unresolved.  This leaves the action 
undetermined and, in the absence of Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) language, will result in 
dismissal of the appeal.51  Second, orders directed at strictly procedural matters, are 
almost never final unless they involve termination of the case.52  For instance, orders 
overruling motions to dismiss,53 orders denying summary judgment motions,54 orders 
regarding requests for change of venue,55 orders entered in reference to motions for 
continuance,56 orders granting or denying motions in limine57 and orders rejecting a 
magistrate’s decision and setting a matter for trial de novo are not final orders.58  
Discovery rulings made in actions that existed at common law, and were not 
specially created by statute, are not final appealable orders59 unless they could be 
characterized as judgments that grant or deny provisional remedies.60 
                                                                
50A rather extensive list of such orders can be found in WHITESIDE, supra note 26, at 59-
76.  
51See, e.g., Karr v. JLH of Athens, Inc., No. 99CA57, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5735 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2000). 
52See Drayer v. Williams, 143 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (orders overruling or 
sustaining motions directed to pleadings are not final orders unless they are accompanied by a 
dismissal and termination of proceedings in the trial court).  See also Colonial Mortgage Serv. 
Co. v. Habitat Assocs., No. 76AP-597, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 8251 (Ohio Ct. App.  Dec. 28, 
1976), (procedural orders regarding time, place and manner of trial are not final and 
appealable).  However, the denial of a motion to intervene as a party defendant (while 
arguably procedural) has been held to be a final order.  Widder & Widder v. Kutnick, 681 
N.E.2d 977 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (non-special proceeding).  This is intuitively logical though 
because such order determines the action and prevents any further judgment with respect to 
the would be intervenor. 
53See, e.g., Hughes v. Zordich, No. 99CA167, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1913 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Apr. 25, 2001); Shane v. Tracey, No. 77025, 2000 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 3844 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Aug. 24, 2000). 
54Stevens v. Ackman, 743 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio 2001); Celebrezze v. Netzley, 554 N.E.2d 
1292, 1293 (Ohio 1990). 
55See, e.g., Mansfield Family Rest. v. CGS Worldwide, Inc., No. 00-CA-3, 2000 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 6187 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2000); Wilson v. Kemp, No. 99CA2667, 1999 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5753 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1999). 
56See, e.g., Miller v. Bauer, 746 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State v. Yee, 563 
N.E.2d 54, 56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
57Covington v. Sawyer, 458 N.E.2d 465, 469-470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); In re Isaacs, No. 
18104, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3491 (Ohio Ct. App. July. 31, 2000). 
58AAA Pipe Cleaning Corp. v. Arrow Unif. Rental, Inc., No. 74215, 1999 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3381 (Ohio Ct. App. July 22, 1999). 
59Walters v. The Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc., 676 N.E.2d at 893 (Ohio 1997); 
State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83, at paragraph seven of the syllabus (Ohio 
1994). 
60See infra notes 219-261 and accompanying text. 
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Appellate courts frequently encounter problems with judgments that leave one or 
more issues in a claim unresolved.  For example, judgments that determine liability 
but defer the issue of damages for later adjudication do not determine the entire 
action and thus are neither final nor appealable.61  Likewise, judgments awarding 
attorney fees, but deferring the amount of those fees for later adjudication are not 
final62 nor are judgments that fail to dispose of a request for prejudgment interest.63    
There has also been confusion over the distinction between decisions and final 
judgment entries.  A judgment includes a decree and any order from which an appeal 
lies.64  Judgments must terminate the entire action, and determine the rights of the 
parties, leaving nothing for further adjudication.65  A document in the nature of a 
decision or opinion which calls for the preparation of a journal entry consistent with 
the court’s reasoning is not a final order.66  Only after there is an entry fully 
adjudicating the rights of the parties is there an order, which can be appealed.  
Practitioners also need to be aware that interplay with other procedural rules may 
affect the finality of the judgments they seek to appeal.  For instance, an order that 
merely adopts a magistrate’s recommended decision pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 
53(E)(4), but does not specify the relief being granted to the parties, is not 
appealable.67  Moreover, otherwise final judgments are not appealable if there are 
unresolved Ohio R. Civ. P. 59 or Ohio R. Crim. P. 33 motions for new trial68 or 
unanswered Ohio R. Civ. P. 52 requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law.69  
                                                                
61See, e.g., State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 684 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ohio 
1997); see also GTE North, Inc. v. Carr, 618 N.E.2d 249, 250, n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
62See, e.g., Ft. Frye Teachers Ass’n v. Ft. Frye Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 623 N.E.2d 
232, 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Cole v. Cole, No. 93CA2146, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5375 
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1993); Pickens v. Pickens, No. 459, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4450 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1992). 
63Timmotors, Inc. v. Lima Ford, Inc., No. 1-2000-11, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3620 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001) (decision on cross-appeal); Grubbs v. Brown, No. CA8471, 1991 
Ohio App. LEXIS 3178 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 24, 1991). 
64Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(A). 
652 KLEIN & DARLING, CIVIL PRACTICE § 54-1 (1997) (a civil action is terminated by the 
court judgment); 63 OHIO JUR. 3D Judgments § 376 (2002) (a final judgment inter alia 
determines the rights of the parties). 
66Millies v. Millies, 350 N.E.2d 675, 667 (Ohio 1976); see also Prod. Credit Assn v. 
Hedges, 621 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Minix v. Collier, No. 98CA2619, 
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3405 (Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 1999). 
67Harkai v. Scherba Indus., 736 N.E.2d 101, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Wellborn v. K-
Beck Furn. Mart, Inc., 375 N.E.2d 61, 62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). 
68State v. Untied, Muskingum App. No. CT2001-19 (Apr. 17, 2002) (unreported); 
Gallucci v. Freshour, No. 99CA22, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3002 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 
2000); Columbus v. Triplett,. No. 99AP-368, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5983 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 14, 1999); State v. Rhoden, No. 95CA562, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3574 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 19, 1996). 
69Caudill v. Caudill, 594 N.E.2d 1096, 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Caruthers v. Caruthers 
No. 00CA09, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 402 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2001).  Similarly, in 
proceedings on petitions for postconviction relief pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.21, 
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Compliance with the technical requirements of these rules is necessary to determine 
the action and make the judgment final and appealable. 
Though less common than in civil proceedings, these jurisdictional deficiencies 
occur in criminal cases as well.  Practitioners should note that a final order in a 
criminal prosecution is one that contains a sentence amounting to a disposition of the 
entire case.70  Thus, an appeal from the jury’s verdict, or the court’s judgment of 
conviction, before sentence is imposed, is premature.71  From the defense standpoint, 
virtually no order other than the final judgment of conviction and sentence is ever 
appealable.  Examples of cases dismissed for lack of a final order include appeals 
from judgments denying motions to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy,72 
judgments denying motions to suppress evidence73 and judgments denying motions 
to dismiss for speedy trial violations.74  None of these rulings determine the action 
and prevent a judgment.  From the prosecution standpoint, interlocutory appeals can 
be taken from orders that grant motions to suppress evidence or dismiss part, or all, 
of an indictment or complaint.75  When appealing an order suppressing evidence, the 
State must certify that its appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the 
trial court’s ruling rendered its proof with respect to the pending charge so weak as 
to destroy any reasonable probability of effective prosecution.76  The State also has 
other limited rights of appeal regarding ancillary criminal matters.77  Whether the 
order being appealed originates in a criminal or civil context, however, practitioners 
should keep in mind that appeals under section 2505.02(B)(1) must generally wait 
                                                          
judgments dismissing the petition that are not accompanied by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are not final and appealable.  State ex rel. Baker v. Common Pleas Court, 
No. 830, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 811 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2000); State v. Girts, No. 
73749, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5934 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1998); State v. Smith, No. 
97CA807, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 874 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1998). 
70See State v. Hunt, 351 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ohio 1976); State v. Chamberlain, 202 N.E.2d 
695, 696 (Ohio 1964).   
71See, e.g., Cuyahoga Falls v. Andy, No. 17529, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1149 (Ohio Ct. 
App. March 27, 1996); Coshocton v. James, No. 90-CA-6, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4823 
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1990). 
72State v. Prokos, No. 00CA02, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2387 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 
2000); State v. Leonhardt, Nos. C-950193, C-950194, C-950258 & C-950259, 1996 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4165 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 25, 1996). 
73State v. Prieto, No. 99CA263 & 99CA264, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4857 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Oct. 14, 1999); see also infra notes 261-265 and accompanying text. 
74Middletown v. Jackson, 457 N.E.2d 898, 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); State v. Serednesky, 
No. 99CA7, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5812 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1999); State v. Edwards, 
No. CA89-07-103, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 3582 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 18, 1989). 
75OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.67(A) (Anderson 2002). 
76Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(K)(1)&(2).  This certification, as well as the notice of appeal, must 
be filed within seven days of the entry suppressing or excluding evidence.  Id. 
77See OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.67(A) (state may appeal as of right an order granting return 
of seized property or post conviction relief and may seek leave to appeal any other decision of 
the trial court except for the final verdict); OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.08(B)(1)-(3) (state may 
appeal sentences based on state felony sentencing guidelines under certain circumstances). 
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until the entire case has been resolved and the matter formally terminated before the 
order can be reviewed. 
IV.  ORDERS AFFECTING A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT MADE IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING 
The second category of final orders under section 2505.02 are those that affect a 
substantial right made in a “special proceeding.”78  This category has proven the 
most conceptually difficult for the bench and bar over the years and the analytical 
process for determining whether an action is a special proceeding has been likened 
by one writer to “the old medieval question of how many angels can sit on the head 
of a pin.”79  For many years, section 2505.02 never defined a “special proceeding” or 
delineated the sorts of actions that fell within that rubric.  Crafting a workable 
definition fell to the judiciary, but implementation of differing standards over time, 
as well as inconsistent application of those standards, led to considerable confusion 
and a lack of predictability.  Finally, in 1998, the Ohio General Assembly stepped in 
and defined a special proceeding as “an action or proceeding that is specially created 
by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in 
equity.”80  This definition essentially codified the culmination of special proceeding 
jurisprudence as it evolved over the last century and a half.  To better understand the 
current definition, practitioners and judges must understand the previous definitions 
and the manner in which they were applied.  That history is best understood in 
reference to the seminal case of Amato v. General Motors Corp.81  Though Amato is 
no longer the applicable standard, case law interpreting the concept of a special 
proceeding is oftentimes thought of as being Pre-Amato, Amato or Post-Amato.  
Each of these periods is discussed as follows. 
                                                                
78OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(2).  The same principles concerning “substantial rights” 
that applied with respect to the first category of final orders, apply here as well.  See supra 
notes 24-32 and accompanying text.  Moreover, this category of final orders also includes 
those rulings that affect a substantial right and are made upon a summary application in an 
action after judgment.  There is little case law discussing this variety of proceeding.  The term 
summary application is not specifically defined by statute but seems to include those 
situations that arise after judgment and do not involve lengthy trial court proceedings.  State v. 
Wilkinson, Montgomery App. No. 18286, (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2000) (unreported); State 
v. Kelly, No. 18170, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5074 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2000).  Thus, the 
denial of a post-judgment motion to take a polygraph exam is an order made upon summary 
application, see State v. Branham, No. H-95-066, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5247 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 27, 1995), as is a ruling on a post-judgment motion for sanctions pursuant to OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2323.51, see Victoria’s Garden v. Sheehy, No. 93AP-404, 1993 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3759 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 27, 1993), and an action seeking an order for judgment 
debtor exam.  See Hessell v. Polen, No. 9920, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 9731 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Nov. 26, 1986).  The Court in Kelly and Wilkinson, both held that rulings on motions for shock 
probation were orders entered in a summary application after judgment and were thus final 
and appealable.  Those holdings are no longer good law given the decision of the Ohio 
Supreme Court in Coffman, 742 N.E.2d at 644.  See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
79Michael J. Buenger, Ohio Appellate Practice Before and After Polikoff: Are Things 
Really all That Much Clearer?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 11 (1994). 
80OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(A)(2). 
81423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981). 
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A.  The Pre-Amato Classification of a Special Proceeding 
The Ohio Supreme Court first spoke to the issue of a “special proceeding” more 
than a century ago in Watson & Co. v. Sullivan,82 which dealt with a lawsuit brought 
to recover money.  Contemporaneously with its complaint, the plaintiff sought and 
obtained an order of attachment against the defendant’s property.  Defendant moved 
the common pleas court to discharge the attachment and his motion was granted.  
Plaintiff appealed that ruling but the defendant argued that an appeal could not be 
taken until after disposition of the whole case.  The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed 
and found that attachment was a “special proceeding”83 and that the order dissolving 
that attachment affected a substantial right84 thereby making the order final and 
appealable.  In defining a “special proceeding,” the Court turned to recent legislation 
establishing a code of civil procedure and reasoned as follows: 
The 3d section of the code abolishes the distinction between actions at 
law and suits in chancery, and substitutes in their place but one form of 
action, called a civil action.  The commissioners, in their report to the 
Legislature upon this section, say: “A civil action, under this code, will 
comprehend every proceeding in court heretofore instituted by any and all 
the forms hereby abolished.  Every other proceeding will be something 
else than an action; say, ‘a special proceeding.”  The Legislature seems to 
regard all proceedings, not theretofore obtained by suit or action, as a 
special proceeding, or special statutory remedy; and it would seem to 
follow, that a provision in the code providing a proceeding, not by action, 
would be a special proceeding.85 
The Court thus adopted what was essentially an “historical basis test.”  This test 
asked whether the proceeding in question existed at either common law or equity 
prior to 1853.  If the answer to that question was yes, then the proceeding was an 
ordinary civil action and an interlocutory order entered therein was not final.  
However, if the answer was no, then the action was a “special proceeding” and, so 
long as the order entered therein affected a substantial right, it was final and 
appealable. 
The problem with this test was that it was never strictly or consistently applied.  
Even in Watson & Co., the Supreme Court deviated from its own standard.  The real 
claim in that case was to recover money, an action that has long existed at common 
                                                                
825 Ohio St. 42 (Ohio 1855). 
83Id. at 45. 
84Id. at 43. 
85Id. at 44.  Effective June 1, 1853, Ohio abolished the distinction between actions at law 
and suits in equity and established in their place a single form of action called a “civil action.”  
See 2 REVISED STATUTES OF OHIO § 3 (Swann & Critchfield 1860).  Civil actions thereafter 
included all proceedings previously regarded as actions at law or suits in equity.  See 1 OHIO 
JUR. 3D Actions § 5 (1998).  This classification scheme survives to this day in the guise of 
Ohio R. Civ. P. 2, which states that there shall be only one form of action and that is a “civil 
action.” 
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law.86  Attachment is only an ancillary remedy to achieve that end87 and, generally, 
has no status separate and apart from a civil action to recover money.88  However, the 
Supreme Court treated the attachment as an entirely separate proceeding and applied 
the test to that remedy rather than the underlying action to recover money.89  Further, 
rather than inquire whether attachment had existed at common law or equity prior to 
1853, the Court simply opined that it was a special proceeding.90 
This sort of inconsistent rhetoric and incongruent application of the historical 
basis test bred confusion and conflicting results over time.  On the one hand, the 
Supreme Court defined a “special proceeding” in contradistinction to a civil action 
(thus reinforcing that the test was to determine whether the action existed at law or in 
equity prior to 1853)91 but then, on the other hand, would remark that the question of 
whether an order is reviewable should be answered by looking at its substance and 
effect without regard to whether it was of a legal or equitable nature.92  In many 
instances, the Court applied no test at all and simply ruled ipso facto that an action 
was a special proceeding.93  Further, as in Watson & Co., the Court oftentimes 
                                                                
86The factual recitation in Watson & Co. is a bit sparse and the Supreme Court never 
clearly stated the nature of the claim except to say that it was “an action” to “recover a large 
sum of money.” 5 Ohio St. at 42.  However, the fact that plaintiff sought attachment would 
suggest that this was a claim on a debt.  See 24 OHIO JUR. 3D Creditors’ Rights and Remedies 
§ 254 (1998) (attachment is a remedy for the collection of an ordinary debt).  A “debt” is a 
sum of money due by contract and an action on a debt was a common law form of action to 
recover a sum certain of money.  See 13 OHIO JUR. Debt § 2 (1930). 
87See Endel v. Leibrock, 33 Ohio St. 254, 267 (Ohio 1877) (attachment proceeding is 
ancillary); Seibert v. Switzer, 35 Ohio St. 661, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1880) 
(attachment is an auxiliary proceeding). 
88Wellborn v. K-Beck Furn. Mart, Inc., 375 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ohio 1977). 
895 Ohio St. at 45.  Attachment proceedings are either in personam or in rem. 24 OHIO JUR. 
3D Creditors’ Rights and Remedies § 257 (1998).  When the principal action is in personam, 
and a judgment can be rendered against a person, then the proceeding is not an independent 
action.  Id.  By contrast, when the principal action is in rem, and is aimed at specific property, 
the attachment is an action in and of itself. Id.  Again, the opinion in Watson & Co. is a little 
vague as to whether the principal action was in rem or in personam.  However, the decision 
states that the action was commenced “to recover a large sum of money against Sullivan.”  5 
Ohio St. at 43.  This suggest that the proceeding was in personam.  Accordingly, attachment 
should have been treated as an ancillary remedy to the principal action to recover debt rather 
than as an independent proceeding. 
905 Ohio St. at 45.  The court was correct in its finding.  Attachment is a statutory 
proceeding, see Carper v. Richards, 13 Ohio St. 219, 222 (Ohio 1862), and is in derogation of 
the common law. Smith v. Buck, 162 N.E. 382, 384 (Ohio 1928).  Nevertheless, the Court 
reached that conclusion without engaging in any analysis. 
91See, e.g., Young v. Shallenberger, 41 N.E. 518, 521 (Ohio 1895); Maginnis v. Schwab, 
24 Ohio St. 336, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1873); Taylor v. Fitch, 12 Ohio St. 
169, at syllabus (Ohio 1861). 
92See, e.g., Webb v. Stasel, 88 N.E. 143, 144 (Ohio 1909); Cincinnati, Sandusky & 
Cleveland RR. Co. v. Sloan, 31 Ohio St. 1, at syllabus (Ohio 1876). 
93See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. PUCO, 65 N.E.2d 68, 69 (Ohio 1946); 
Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Highway, Inc. v. PUCO, 49 N.E.2d 759, 760 (Ohio 1943) 
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focused its attention on the ancillary proceeding rather than the underlying action 
itself.94 
This confusion in early special proceeding jurisprudence is best illustrated by the 
Court’s treatment of probate cases.  The Supreme Court held in Missionary Society 
of M.E. Church v. Ely that an application to admit a will to probate is a “special 
proceeding” so that a judgment denying that application was a final appealable 
order.95  In reaching that conclusion, however, the Court applied a somewhat 
different definition of special proceeding: 
But we suppose that any ordinary proceedings in a court of justice, by 
which a party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a 
right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public 
offense, involving the process and pleadings, and ending in a judgment, is 
an action, while every proceeding other than an action, where a remedy is 
sought by application to a court for a judgment or an order is a special 
proceeding.96 
At issue in this case was a statute allowing anyone receiving a devise or bequest by 
will the right to present that will for probate.  The Court reasoned that the statute 
conferred a legal right and authorized an application to a court for its enforcement 
and, thus, the proceeding was “of a judicial nature” and belonged to that class of 
special proceedings.97 
However, in Hollrah v. Lasance, the Court held that an order admitting a will to 
probate was not a final appealable order.98  No discussion of special proceedings was 
even made in that case but the Court distinguished its holding in Missionary Society 
of M.E. Church by noting that an order admitting a will to probate could still be 
challenged by a will contest whereas an order excluding a will from probate could 
not.99  The Court reaffirmed that an order admitting a will to probate was not 
reviewable in the case of In re Estate of Frey.100  Again, though, there was no 
                                                          
(PUCO proceedings are special proceedings); Pittsburgh, Cleveland & Toledo RR. Co. v. Tod, 
74 N.E. 172, 174 (Ohio 1905); In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 203 N.E.2d 247, 
248 (Ohio 1964); In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 175 N.E.2d 512, 
513 (Ohio 1961) (appropriation actions are special proceedings). 
94See, e.g., Jones v. First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire, 176 N.E. 567, 569 (Ohio 1931) 
(injunction not a special proceeding); Burke v. Ry. Co., 17 N.E. 557 (Ohio 1888) (order 
overruling motion to dissolve injunction was made in a special proceeding though the nature 
of the action is not even specified); Cincinnati, Sandusky & Cleveland RR. Co., 31 Ohio St. 1 
at syllabus (Ohio 1876); Forrest City Inv. Co. v. Haas, 143 N.E. 549, at syllabus (Ohio 1924) 
(appointment of a receiver is an order made in a special proceeding) 
9556 Ohio St. 405, at syllabus (Ohio 1897) 
96Id. at 407. 
97Id. at 408. 
9863 Ohio St. 58, at syllabus (Ohio 1900). 
99Id. at 65.  It is tempting to try and reconcile this case as being decided on the basis of 
whether or not the order affected a substantial right.  However, the Court’s opinion gives little 
analysis of either concept. 
10040 N.E.2d 145, at syllabus (Ohio 1942). 
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discussion of whether this was a special proceeding.  The Court seemed to focus 
instead on the first category of final orders noting that the order did not determine the 
rights of all interested parties until termination of proceedings.101  Until such rights 
were determined, this was only a “conditional order” because, otherwise, there 
would be “two final orders.”102  A somewhat different question was presented in the 
case of In re Estate of Wykoff103 wherein the Probate Court allowed presentment of a 
late claim under then existing section 2217.07 and the administrator appealed.  The 
Court of Appeals sustained a motion to dismiss for lack of a final order but the 
Supreme Court reversed finding that the order affected a substantial right and was 
entered in a special proceeding.  In reaching this latter conclusion, the Court returned 
to the standard enunciated a century before in Watson & Co: 
We think it can accurately be said that the term, “civil action,” as used in 
our statutes embraces those actions which prior to the adoption of the 
Code of Civil Procedure in 1853 abolishing the distinction between 
actions at law and suits in equity, were denoted as actions at law or suits 
in equity; and that other court proceedings of a civil nature come, 
generally at least, within the classification of special proceedings.104 
The Court found that “the proceeding provided by section 2117.07, Revised Code” 
represented an independent judicial inquiry and was thus a special proceeding.105 
The problems with these cases were two-fold.  First, the Court never consistently 
applied its historical basis test for determining whether an action was a “special 
proceeding.”  Indeed, in some instances, the Court never applied the test at all.  Even 
in Wykoff, where reference was made to the standard first announced in Watson & 
Co., the Court never delved into whether probate actions in general, or “section 
2117.07 proceedings” in particular, existed at common law or equity prior to 1853.  
Instead, the Court determined that this was a special proceeding because it was made 
“in connection with which a petition and no other pleadings are required and wherein 
there is notice only, without service of summons and which represents essentially an 
independent judicial inquiry.”106   
The second problem with these cases is that the Court continued to direct its 
inquiry to ancillary matters rather than the underlying action.  Probate is the process 
by which a will is proved to be valid, or invalid, and includes all matters and 
proceedings pertaining to administration of estates.107  Rather than focus on this 
process in its entirety, the Court focused its attention on each individual and ancillary 
proceeding (e.g. application to admit will to probate, application to present a late 
claim, etc.).  What the Court failed to realize is that probate, like most court actions, 
involves many ancillary proceedings.  Motions will be filed, discovery will be 
                                                                
101Id. at 148. 
102Id. 
103142 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio 1957). 
104Id. at 663. 
105Id. at 664. 
106Id. 
107BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (5th ed. 1979). 
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conducted and the trial courts will enter innumerable orders throughout the course of 
an action.  Had the Ohio Supreme Court in these cases focused its attention on 
determining whether probate cases as a whole were special proceedings, rather than 
each individual application within that action, then the Court might have developed a 
consistent body of case law over the years.108  Instead, varying definitions of what 
was or was not a special proceeding, and focus on ancillary matters rather than the 
underlying action, led to confusion and inconsistency. 
B.  Amato v. General Motors 
The confusing state of “special proceeding” jurisprudence begged for some 
degree of clarification and the Ohio Supreme Court took that opportunity in Amato v. 
General Motors Corp.109  However, rather than refine or clarify the test for 
determining whether an action was a “special proceeding,” or espousing a stricter 
application of the test it had already announced, the Court threw out its old standard 
and adopted a new one altogether. 
Paul Amato was a consumer who bought an Oldsmobile that had been secretly 
equipped with a Chevrolet engine.  Upon discovering the switched engine, he filed 
suit against General Motors asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud and 
violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.  Amato sought, and was 
granted, permission under Ohio R. Civ. P. 23, to represent a class of plaintiffs who 
bought similar cars.  General Motors appealed the class certification, but the case 
was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.  The Ohio Supreme Court 
reversed.  In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the judiciary had been “less than 
precise” in defining a “special proceeding.”110  The Court nevertheless noted that 
certain principles could be gleaned from past cases.  First and foremost was that the 
Court had been “most reluctant” to allow interlocutory rulings during the pendency 
of litigation under the guise that such rulings were made in a special proceeding.111  
Second, from the small class of rulings deemed to have been reviewable under this 
                                                                
108To be fair, the issue of whether the entire probate process is a special proceeding has 
never been definitively stated and defies easy explanation.  Modern probate proceedings can 
trace their lineage back to English ecclesiastical and chancery courts.  1 MERRICK-RIPPNER, 
PROBATE LAW §1.1 (1997).  By the same token, however, provision for descent and 
distribution of property has been provided for by statute in Ohio as far back as the Northwest 
Ordinance.  Id. § 1.4 n.2.  It has also been said that the application to make probate of a will 
belongs neither to the common law nor equity jurisdiction conferred upon common pleas 
courts.  See Hunter’s Will, 6 Ohio 499, 501 (Ohio 1834).  The Ohio Supreme Court has also 
said that the right to transmit or inherit property is not an inherent or natural right but is purely 
a statutory right and subject to legislative control and restriction.  Ostrander v. Preece, 196 
N.E. 670, 673 (Ohio 1935).  This would suggest that, under the Supreme Court’s definition of 
a special proceeding in Watson & Co. and In re Estate of Wykoff, probate proceedings in 
general are “special proceedings.”  Nevertheless, this issue continues to cause disagreement 
among the courts.  See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
109423 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio 1981). 
110Id. 455.  As demonstrated by the cases previously discussed herein, this was an 
understatement of monolithic proportion.  It is also interesting to note that, nowhere in its 
opinion, did the Supreme Court ever recognize its previous standard of looking to whether the 
proceeding had existed as an action at law or equity prior to 1853. 
111Id. 
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category of final orders, a “prime determinant” of whether a particular order was one 
made in a “special proceeding” was “the practicability of appeal after judgment.”112  
The Court thus adopted a “balancing test” for determining whether an order was 
made in a special proceeding: 
This test weighs the harm to the ‘prompt and orderly disposition of 
litigation,’ and the consequent waste of judicial resources, resulting from 
the allowance of an appeal, with the need for immediate review because 
appeal after final judgment is not practical.113 
Applying that standard to the facts at hand, the Court concluded that the balance 
tipped in favor of allowing immediate review.114  The Court thus held that an order 
allowing an action to continue as a class action was made in a special proceeding and 
was a final appealable order.115 
Aside from the novelty of this new balancing test, there were several noteworthy 
analytical anomalies in Amato.  First, the Court need never have reached the whole 
“special proceeding” issue at all.  The Court had already determined that an order 
denying class action status was a final appealable order under the first category of 
section 2505.02 because it effectively determined the action with respect to the 
proposed plaintiff class.116  The Court could have simply extended that holding and 
ruled that an order allowing a class action to be maintained also determined the 
action.117  More importantly, however, the Court in Amato was never entirely clear as 
to whether it was treating the class certification order or the underlying action as the 
“special proceeding.”  It appears from the opinion that the Court was treating the 
ancillary order granting class certification as the special proceeding.118  If that was 
the case, then the Court clearly erred.  A class action is not a proceeding in and of 
                                                                
112Id. at 456 (emphasis added). 
113Id. 
114Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 456.  The Court reasoned that class actions impose enormous 
burdens on courts as well as litigants and, thus, allowing an immediate appeal of a class 
certification that might have been improper may actually conserve judicial resources.  
Furthermore, because the costs of litigation and potential liability were so high for defendants 
in a class action, the Court believed that defendants would be forced to settle the case thereby 
foreclosing any future appellate review as to the propriety of the class certification.  Id. 
115Id. at the syllabus. 
116Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 386, at the syllabus (Ohio 1974).  
See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text. 
117The Court’s reasoning that the litigation costs and potential liability of class actions 
would force companies to settle rather than wait to appeal certification at the end of trial, 
could just as easily have been used to conclude that the trial court’s decision effectively 
determined the action.  Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 456.  Oddly enough, the Court acknowledged 
that it could have decided Amato in this manner, but declined to do so.  Id. at 455 n.9. 
118The Court stated that “an order certifying that an action may be maintained as a class 
action is made in a special proceeding and, as such, it is a final, appealable order.”  Amato, 
423 N.E.2d at 456. 
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itself but rather a procedural device by which to maintain some other action.119  
However, if the Court was looking to the underlying action itself, then it failed to 
explain how the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and common law fraud were 
“special proceedings.” 
If anything, the Amato balancing test proved less workable than the pre-Amato 
historical basis test.  The determination as to whether a proceeding had existed at 
common law or equity prior to 1853 was, at least theoretically, an objective one.  An 
action either existed at common law or equity or it did not.  However, the balancing 
test was entirely subjective.  The Court was oftentimes divided on whether the test 
weighed in favor of immediate review or in favor of review on appeal after final 
judgment.120  The balancing test was also frequently criticized121 and, on occasion, 
even ignored altogether.122 
One of the more significant areas of the law affected by Amato was the issue of 
whether discovery orders were immediately appealable.  Discovery orders had long 
                                                                
119Woods v. Oak Hill Cmty. Med. Ctr., Inc., 730 N.E.2d 1037, 1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); 
Turoff v. Halle Bros. Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 34413 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1976) 
(unreported).  The Court acknowledged that distinction in its opinion but appears to have 
treated the pleading mechanism as a separate cause of action anyway.  See Amato, 423 N.E.2d 
at 454 
120Compare State, ex rel. Celebrezze v. K & S Circuits, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 653, at the 
syllabus (Ohio 1983) (order denying jury trial in water pollution control case not a final order), 
with id. at 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (would allow appeal). Compare Columbus v. Adams, 
461 N.E.2d 887, at the syllabus (Ohio 1984) (pre-trial suspension of an operator’s license of 
one accused of violation of § 4511.19 or municipal ordinance related to operation of a motor 
vehicle while under influence of alcohol not a final order), with id. at 891 (Sweeney, W. 
Brown & C. Brown, JJ., dissenting) (would allow appeal). Compare Tilberry v. Body, 493 
N.E.2d 954, 956 (Ohio 1986) (judicial dissolution of partnership is a special proceeding and 
immediate appeal should be allowed), with id. at 958 (Douglas & Locher, JJ., dissenting) 
(order did not emanate from a special proceeding).  Compare General Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Warden Elec., Inc., 528 N.E.2d 195, at the syllabus (Ohio 1988) (order denying stay of 
litigation pending arbitration and granting motion to dismiss arbitration not a final order), with 
id. at 199 (Wright, Sweeney & Brown, JJ., dissenting) (would allow appeal). 
121See, e.g., Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip. Co., 588 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1992) 
(Douglas & Sweeney, JJ, concurring) (the Amato balancing test is “malleable, non-definitive 
and subjective in nature” and “brings about the necessity of multifarious appeals.”); Stewart v. 
Midwestern Indemn. Co., 543 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (Ohio 1989) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (the 
term “special proceeding” has nothing to do with the test set forth in Amato.  The need for 
immediate review, waste of judicial resources or orderly disposition of litigation does not 
make a proceeding “special.”  A special proceeding is an action not recognized at common 
law or as part of our standard civil practice but is one that has been brought about by a special 
type of action.  Examples would include forcible entry and detainer, declaratory judgment, 
appropriation and arbitration.) 
122See, e.g., General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 266, at the syllabus 
(Ohio 1989) (Declaratory Judgment is a “special proceeding”).  The Court reached this 
conclusion by reasoning that declaratory judgment actions were a special remedy not available 
at common law or at equity.  Because they were unknown at common law, jurisdiction to hear 
such cases were dependent on statutory authorization.  Id. at 271.  This reasoning was 
reminiscent of the Pre-Amato historical basis test.  No mention was made of the Amato 
balancing test. 
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been considered interlocutory and not subject to immediate appeal.123  After Amato, 
however, the Court carved out several exceptions to that longstanding rule.   In State 
v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc. the Court held that an order compelling disclosure of 
the identity of a confidential informant was a final appealable order.124  The Court 
reasoned that the balancing test weighed in favor of an immediate appeal because, 
once the informant’s identity was revealed, no appeal could remedy the harm of that 
disclosure.125  Similarly, in Humphrey v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., it was held that 
an order compelling disclosure of names of patients who had contracted 
Legionnaire’s Disease while at a hospital was a final order.126  The Court reasoned 
that the need for immediate appellate review so as to protect patient privilege 
outweighed any potential disruption to the proceeding or waste of judicial 
resources.127  Retreating from these positions a bit, the Court held in Nelson v. Toledo 
Oxygen & Equip. Co. that a discovery order both compelling the production of 
documents and overruling a claim that the materials sought were exempt as work 
product was not a final order.128  This time, the Court held that the balancing test 
weighed in favor of review after final judgment in the case.129 
Despite its flaws, the balancing test was not without some benefit.130  The basic 
theme of Amato and its progeny was that a party should be granted an immediate 
right of review where harm resulting to that party was extreme and irreparable.131  
Thus, in Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, an immediate appeal was allowed of an order 
compelling disclosure of the identity of a blood donor infected with the HIV virus.132  
It was aptly noted by the Court of Appeals that, absent immediate review, the 
donor’s rights of privacy and confidentiality in medical diagnosis would be 
compromised and that this was a wrong which could not be later corrected on 
subsequent review.133  This result seems intuitively reasonable and just.  Even if the 
equities weighed in favor of disclosing the donor’s identity, the donor’s rights to 
                                                                
123Kennedy v. Chalfin, 310 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ohio 1974); In re Coastal States Petroleum, 
290 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ohio 1972); Klein v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Brake Co., 234 
N.E.2d 587, 589 (Ohio 1968). 
124465 N.E.2d 865, at the syllabus (Ohio 1984). 
125Id. at 867. 
126488 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ohio 1986). 
127Id. at 879.  Several of the justices disagreed noting that this was an ordinary civil action 
and was not a special proceeding.  Id. at 880 (Douglas & Sweeney, JJ., dissenting). 
128588 N.E.2d 789, at the syllabus (Ohio 1992). 
129Id. at 791. 
130Buenger, supra note 79, at 15 (the advantage of the Amato test was in its flexibility). 
131Hollis v. Finger, 590 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Galbreath v. Galbreath, 
No. 89AP-103, 1989 WL 65389 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 13, 1989).  This would essentially 
become the underlying premise for allowing appeals from orders that grant or deny 
provisional remedies under OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(4).  See infra notes 225-228 and 
accompanying text. 
132538 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
133Id. 
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privacy and confidentiality were substantial enough that immediate review seemed 
warranted.134  The price paid to achieve that review, however, was a lack of 
consistency and widely divergent opinions as to what sort of discovery orders were 
immediately appealable.135 
C.  Post-Amato 
After twelve years of inconsistent application and widely divergent rulings, the 
Supreme Court overruled Amato and got rid of the balancing test in Polikoff v. 
Adam.136  Harry Polikoff, trustee under the will of Marjorie Polikoff, filed a 
shareholder derivative suit against TRW, Inc., its board of directors and officers.  
The defendants moved to dismiss arguing that plaintiff failed to make the requisite 
demand under Ohio R. Civ. P. 23.1 or plead that such demand would have been 
futile.137  Their motion was denied and defendants appealed to the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of a final order.  An appeal was 
then taken to the Ohio Supreme Court, which was asked to decide whether the denial 
                                                                
134The Court ultimately held that the donor’s privacy interests, as well as the interest of 
maintaining an adequate volunteer blood supply, outweighed the interests of the plaintiff 
seeking disclosure of the information.  Id. at 425. 
135See, e.g., Cent. Benefits Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Emp. Comp. Bd., 604 N.E.2d 198, 199 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (discovery order to obtain allegedly confidential information from 
insurance company not made in a special proceeding); Lomano v. Cigna Healthplan of 
Columbus, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (discovery order seeking 
information regarding physician’s application to join organization’s list of member physicians 
not a special proceeding); Grant v. Collier, No. 12670, 1992 WL 28161 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 
23, 1992) (order compelling discovery of medical records made in a special proceeding); 
Medley v. Taylor, No. WD-90-16, 1991 WL 59883 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1991) (discovery 
order concerning privileged medical records not appealable); Wozniak v. Kombrink, Hamilton 
App. No. C-890531 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1991) (unreported) (discovery order concerning 
medical histories of non-party patients was made in special proceeding); Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Desprez, No. 52634, 1987 WL 6120 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1987) (discovery 
order mandating production of work product in an insurance company’s claim file arose in a 
special proceeding); In re Guardianship of Johnson, 519 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1987) (court ordered psychiatric evaluation on a guardianship application occurs in a special 
proceeding and is immediately appealable); Foor v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 499 N.E.2d 1297, 
1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (order overruling motion to quash subpoena duces tecum served on 
non-party was a final order); George E. Kuhn & Co. v. Genslinger, No. 12786, 1992 WL 
157717 (Ohio Ct. App. July 8, 1992) (order compelling discovery of trade secrets held to be 
made in a special proceeding).  But see Trionix Research Lab., Inc. v. ADAC Laboratories, 
Inc., 15896, 1993 WL 208306 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1993) (discovery order into technology 
and trade secrets did not rise to the level of a special proceeding); Klaban v. Chiefs, Inc., No. 
CA91-02-022, 1991 WL 99622 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 1991) (discovery order regarding 
trade secrets and alleged confidential information not made in a special proceeding). 
136616 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio 1993). 
137Id. at 214.  The provisions of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23.1 state, in pertinent part, that the 
complaint in a shareholder derivative action must allege with particularity the efforts, if any, 
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors and the reasons for his 
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. 
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of the motion to dismiss was an order affecting a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding.138 
Before addressing this question directly, the Court first paused to consider the 
historical development of special proceeding jurisprudence.139  The Court noted that, 
as far back as 1855, a special proceeding was defined as one that previously did not 
exist as an action at law or a suit in equity prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil 
Procedure.140  This standard was carried over into other cases and applied, more or 
less consistently, for over a century.141  By contrast, the Amato balancing test was 
developed in the early 1980s making it a recent, and arguably ill-advised, deviation 
from long established precedent. 
The Court then cited several of its own recent cases to illustrate that application 
of the balancing test had led to “disparate conclusions.”142  The Court noted that 
application of the balancing test varied with each case “proving that it [was] 
impossible to ensure the objective application of subjective criteria.”143  Thus, in the 
interests of justice, clarity and judicial economy, the Court deemed it time to 
abandon the balancing test and return to the historical basis test previously used to 
determine whether an action was a special proceeding.144  Amato was therefore 
overruled and the Court held that orders entered in actions that were recognized at 
common law or in equity, and not specially created by statute, are not orders entered 
in special proceedings for purposes of section 2505.02.145  Applying that test to the 
facts of the case, the Court noted that shareholder derivative suits had long been 
recognized as suits in equity and, thus, did not fall under the definition of a special 
proceeding.146  Consequently, the order appealed was not final and the appellate 
court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. 
The Polikoff decision was correct insofar as it abandoned the unwieldy and 
subjective Amato balancing test and returned to a more logically consistent and 
objective historical basis test.  Nevertheless, the decision is problematic for several 
reasons.  First, as it has periodically done in these cases, the Supreme Court 
misdirected its legal analysis to a procedural matter (i.e. the mechanism for 
maintaining a shareholder derivative suit) rather than the underlying claim in the 
case.  Had the Court properly applied the test set out in its syllabus to the underlying 
claim, rather than the procedural mechanism affecting how that claim was brought, 
                                                                
138Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 217-18. 
139Id. at 215-17. 
140Id. at 215 (citing Watson & Co., 5 Ohio St. at 42). 
141Id. at 216 (citing Missionary Society of M.E. Church, 47 N.E. at 537 and In re Estate of 
Wykoff, 142 N.E.2d at 660). 
142Id. at 217 (citing inter alia Humphrey, 448 N.E.2d at 877 and Nelson, 588 N.E.2d at 
789). 
143Id. at 217. 
144Id. 
145Id. at the syllabus. 
146Id. at 218. 
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the Court would have concluded that this was an order entered in a special 
proceeding.147  This mistake would come back to haunt the Court in later cases.148 
Another problem with the Polikoff decision concerns some superfluous dicta at 
the end of the opinion.  After holding that special proceedings would now be defined 
as proceedings which were not previously actions at law or suits in equity, and were 
specially created by statute, the Court should have stopped.  Instead, the decision 
concludes with the following bizarre paragraph: 
We look next at the nature of the relief sought.  Appellees sought redress 
of an alleged wrong by filing a lawsuit in the court of common pleas.  
This not a case wherein the aggrieved party filed a special petition seeking 
a remedy that was conferred upon that party by an Ohio statute nor is it a 
proceeding that represents what is essentially an independent judicial 
inquiry.  In examining the ultimate reviewability of the order, we find that 
the facts needed to analyze this precise issue will be unchanged by the 
ultimate disposition of the underlying action.  The question of whether 
appellees complied with Ohio R. Civ. P. 23.1 will be preserved 
throughout this litigation.  The underlying action can be distinguished 
from a special proceeding in that it provides for an adversarial hearing on 
the issues of fact and law which arise from the pleadings and which will 
result in a judgment for the prevailing party.149 
Though far from a model of clarity, this paragraph appears to add no fewer than 
three additional tests for determining whether an action is a special proceeding: (1) 
Does the action involve filing a “special petition” seeking a remedy conferred by 
statute?  (2) Is the proceeding one which represents what is essentially an 
independent judicial inquiry? (3) Does it provide for an adversarial hearing on issues 
                                                                
147The complaint alleged various violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act codified at 15 
U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Polikof, 616 N.E.2d at 214.  Civil liability for a violation of those 
provisions is set out in 15 U.S.C. 1681n.  Because this is an action specially created by statute, 
which did not exist at common law or equity, it was in fact a special proceeding. 
148See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.  The Court made the same mistake in 
another case decided the same day as Polikoff.  In Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 616 N.E.2d 181, 
183-84 (Ohio 1993), a medical malpractice action, the Court noted that an ancillary 
proceeding for prejudgment interest was a “special proceeding” because the right to obtain 
prejudgment interest was statutory in nature and did not exist at common law.  Rather than 
focus on the request for prejudgment interest, however, the Court should have focused on the 
underlying medical malpractice action, which obviously did exist at common law.  See 67 
OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 1 (1999) (malpractice actions are loosely based on common law 
negligence theories).  A year later, the Court reversed itself and held that a request for 
prejudgment interest was not a special proceeding.  Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 
N.E.2d 331, at paragraph four of the syllabus (Ohio 1994).  However, the Court reached that 
decision not because it finally realized that a request for prejudgment interest was an ancillary 
proceeding to the underlying claim, but because it had come to the conclusion that such 
proceedings did exist at common law after all.  Id. at 347.  Finally, in Walters v. Enrichment 
Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc., 676 N.E.2d 890, 893-94 (Ohio 1997), the Court came to the 
realization that it is the underlying action which should be analyzed to determine if the case 
involves a special proceeding and not the ancillary order being appealed. 
149Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d at 218 (citations omitted). 
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of fact and law?  The Court never defined many of these terms or explained the 
parameters of the tests or how they would relate to the historical basis test set out in 
the syllabus.  As one commentator noted, rather than creating a simple and clear test 
for determining what constitutes a special proceeding, the court’s standard is 
“complex,” “prone to produce inconsistent results” and requires a multi-prong 
analysis so subtle in its distinctions that it is likely to produce great confusion.150  
Fortunately, that result has been avoided as most courts have simply ignored the 
dicta.  The General Assembly also eliminated any need to consider it by taking the 
syllabus language from Polikoff and codifying it into section 2505.02(A)(2).  This 
new statutory definition eliminates any need to apply extraneous tests set out in the 
body of the Polikoff opinion. 
These problems notwithstanding, Polikoff also was not the panacea that resolved 
all difficulties surrounding the determination of whether an action was a “special 
proceeding.”  To begin, there is still a substantial body of case law applying the 
Amato balancing test and holding that a particular action is, or is not, a special 
proceeding.  Practitioners dealing with this issue in the courts of appeals must be 
careful when citing cases prior to 1993 for the proposition that a particular order is 
final and appealable.  Those unfamiliar with the subtle nuances of this area of the 
law could mistakenly cite a case in support of their contention that an order was final 
and be unaware that the precedential underpinning of the case they are citing has 
been explicitly or implicitly overruled.151 
Further complicating matters is that the process of determining whether an action 
previously existed at common law or equity is sometimes easier said than done.  The 
Supreme Court held in Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. that an action for pre-judgment 
interest is a special proceeding because it “is purely statutory in nature and was 
unavailable at common law”152 only to reverse itself the following year and come to 
the opposite conclusion.153  Another example can be found in probate proceedings.  
The various appellate districts in this State continue to split over the question of 
whether probate actions are, in fact, special proceedings.154 
                                                                
150Buenger, supra note 79, at 22-23. 
151Courts are not immune to this problem either.  The Fourth Appellate District in State v. 
Mounts, 644 N.E.2d 1129, 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), dismissed an appeal from an 
administrative license suspension (ALS) based on the decision of Columbus v. Adams, 461 
N.E.2d 887, at the syllabus (Ohio 1984).  As was aptly noted by the dissent, however, Adams 
was decided on the basis of the Amato balancing test which had since been overruled by 
Polikoff and, thus, was no longer good authority.  Mounts, 644 N.E.2d at 1130 (Harsha, J., 
dissenting).  After that, most courts held that an ALS was a final appealable order.  See 
Vermilion v. McCullough, 666 N.E.2d 269, 271 (Ohio 1995); Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles v. 
Williams, 647 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).  The Ohio Supreme Court finally 
revisited the issue in State v. Williams, 667 N.E.2d 932, at paragraph two of the syllabus 
(Ohio 1996), and held that an ALS was an order entered in a special proceeding (overruling 
Adams). 
152Bell, 616 N.E.2d at 183. 
153Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d at 347. 
154Cases indicating that these are not special proceedings include In re Estate of Pulford, 
701 N.E.2d 55, 56-57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of Endslow, No. 99CA-F-07-37, 
2000 WL 502819 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2000); In re Estate of Packo, No. L-99-1350, 2000 
WL 191784 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2000); In re Estate of Adams, No. OT-98-047, 1999 WL 
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In addition, the Supreme Court’s mistaken focus on the procedural order in 
Polikoff, rather than the underlying claim, led some courts to follow suit and consider 
the ancillary orders being appealed rather than the case as a whole to determine if a 
special proceeding was involved.  In Niemann v. Cooley, the Hamilton County Court 
of Appeals held that an order compelling production of psychiatric and counseling 
information over an assertion of patient-physician privilege was a final order.155  The 
Court acknowledged the Polikoff standard but reasoned that the case “should not be 
read in so sweeping a fashion ‘that it renders all orders in suits that were recognized 
at common law as not being final orders.’”156  The Court looked, instead, to the 
nature of the privilege asserted rather than the underlying action.  Concluding that 
the privilege was statutory, the Court held that the order appealed was entered in a 
special proceeding.157  Similarly, in Arnold v. Am. Natl. Red Cross, the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals found that an order compelling the disclosure of the 
identity of a donor of blood infected with HIV was made in a special proceeding and 
hence was a final order.158  In so doing, the Court reasoned that an analysis of 
whether the underlying action was recognized at common law or in equity is only the 
first inquiry.159  The case must be decided, however, by “reviewing the specific 
proceeding in question leading to the order being appealed.”160  Inasmuch as 
disclosure of HIV test results or diagnosis was barred by statute, the Court concluded 
that the order being appealed emanated from a special proceeding.161  Though in 
conflict with the Polikoff syllabus, Niemann and Arnold were both perfectly 
                                                          
1262074 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1999).  Cases holding that probate proceedings are special 
proceedings include In re Myers, 669 N.E.2d 53, 54 (Ohio 1995); In re Estate of Nussbaum, 
No. C-990527, 2000 WL 1005201 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2000); In re Estate of Lilley, Nos. 
CA99-07-083, CA99-07-084, CA99-08-087 & CA99-08-088, 1999 WL 1239470 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 20, 1999); In re Estate of Knauff, No. 96CA623, 1997 WL 305232 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 27, 1997).  A certified conflict between these cases was accepted for review by the Ohio 
Supreme court in In re Estate of Bloom, 735 N.E.2d 455 (Ohio 2000), but was later dismissed 
on application of the appellant.  In re Estate of Bloom, 739 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 2000).  The 
issue remains unresolved. 
155637 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
156Id. (citing with approval Stevens v. Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 14042, 1993 
WL 420127 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1993)). 
157Id. 
158639 N.E.2d 484, 490 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
159Id. at 489. 
160Id. (emphasis added). 
161Id. at 490.  It is interesting to note that the underlying action in Niemann was for assault 
and in Arnold it was negligence, both of which are tort actions that long existed at common 
law.  Had the Courts in these cases looked to the underlying actions, as directed by Polikoff, 
rather than the specific nature of the order being appealed, they would have come to the 
inexorable conclusion that these were not special proceedings and that the orders appealed 
therein were simply interlocutory, non-appealable, discovery orders.  This raises suspicion that 
the courts may have purposely misdirected their analyses to the procedural orders, rather than 
the underlying actions, in order to address the important privacy and confidentiality questions 
at issue in the case. 
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consistent with the mistaken manner in which the Supreme Court applied its own 
test. 
Not every court followed the reasoning in Niemann and Arnold162 and the Ohio 
Supreme Court eventually held that those two cases “misinterpreted” Polikoff.163  In 
rather emphatic language, the Court made clear that it was the underlying action 
rather than the order itself that was important: 
Since there appears to be much confusion among appellate courts as to 
precisely what was meant in the Polikoff syllabus, we will proceed to 
clarify that syllabus paragraph.  The determining factor of Polikoff is 
whether the “action” was recognized at common law or in equity and not 
whether the “order” was so recognized.  In making the determination 
courts need look only at the underlying action.  The type of order being 
considered is immaterial.  To focus on the nature of the order itself is to 
return to the balancing test of Amato.  Such an approach is irreconcilable 
with Polikoff …. Under Polikoff, it is the underlying action that must be 
examined to determine whether an order was entered in a special 
proceeding.  In the case sub judice, the underlying action was an ordinary 
civil action, seeking damages.  It was recognized at common law and 
hence was not a special proceeding.164 
Another problematic area of the law since returning to a historical basis test has 
been the field of domestic relations.  One year after Polikoff, the Supreme Court 
decided the case of State ex rel. Papp v. James.165  Although James was an original 
action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and had nothing whatsoever to do 
with appellate jurisdiction over final orders, the Court inexplicably went out of its 
way to enunciate that divorce was a special proceeding for purposes of section 
2505.02.166  This pronouncement was made with respect to a change of custody order 
rendered just a little over a week before entry of a “divorce decree” confirming that 
judgment.167  Carried to its conclusion, reductio ad absurdum, this ruling would 
seem to suggest that virtually any interlocutory order in a divorce proceeding is 
immediately appealable.  However, as most practitioners in the field would confirm, 
emotions run high in domestic cases and allowing parties to immediately appeal 
every single order therein, and frustrate their ex-spouse or drag the proceedings out 
in endless appeals, is neither desirable nor practical. 
                                                                
162See, e.g., Uschold v. Cmty. Blood Ctr., 647 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); 
Turner v. Romans, No. 95APE05-528, 1995 WL 390933 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 30, 1995); In re 
Grand Jury, Nos. 93CA09, 93CA10 & 93CA12, 1995 WL 365386 (Jul. 12, 1995) (entry on 
Application for Reconsideration); see also McHenry v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co., 662 N.E.2d 51, 52 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (Patton, J., concurring) (critical of Niemann and Arnold). 
163Walters, 676 N.E.2d at 893. 
164Id. at 893.  The Supreme Court’s criticism of the lower appellate court in this case was a 
little disingenuous given that the Supreme Court had also erroneously focused on the order 
appealed, rather than the underlying action, in Polikoff, Bell and Moskovitz. 
165632 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1994). 
166Id. at 894-95. 
167Id. 
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The James case is not without its critics and detractors.168  Many courts have 
avoided the absurd results that would follow from strict compliance with James by 
focusing attention on whether the order, even if made in a special proceeding, truly 
affects a substantial right.169  Thus, in a good many cases, appeals from patently 
interlocutory judgments have been dismissed on the basis that effective relief can be 
had when all issues in the case are resolved.170  Depending on the order in question, 
however, some courts have found that a substantial right is affected and allowed an 
immediate appeal.171  The guiding principle to keep in mind with domestic cases is 
that appellate courts are reluctant to allow piecemeal appeals on every issue unless 
there is an express showing that one of the litigants will be irreparably harmed in the 
absence of immediate review - that is to say, a “substantial right” must be clearly and 
irrevocably affected.  Otherwise, the entire matter can be reviewed once all of the 
issues are resolved at the trial level. 
These problems aside, the Supreme Court returned, at least theoretically, to a 
more consistent and less subjective means of determining whether an action was, or 
was not, a “special proceeding.”  By focusing on whether the action previously 
existed at common law or equity, or whether it was specially created by statute, the 
Court re-implemented a historical basis test it first adopted over a century ago but 
unfortunately failed to consistently apply.  The Court even appeared to be correcting 
its misguided focus on ancillary orders by re-emphasizing that it is the underlying 
action, and not the order being appealed, which should be the focus of inquiry.  All 
these signs pointed to a more settled system of special proceeding jurisprudence.  
Then came the decision in Stevens v. Ackman.172 
This case involved a wrongful death action filed by Shira Stevens against Emily 
Ackman and the city of Middletown, Ohio.173  The City moved for summary 
                                                                
168Two justices declined to join in that portion of the opinion because there was “no need” 
to even reach that issue.  Id. at 896-97 (Resnick & Wright, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  See also In re Estate of Pulford, 701 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) 
(Ford, J., writing for a unanimous court states that he does not agree with the “historical 
rendition of the common law” as it was offered in James). 
169Buck v. Buck, 660 N.E.2d 475, 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding that even when an 
order is issued in a special proceeding, it is only immediately appealable provided it affects a 
substantial right). 
170Id. (order reducing child support arrearage to judgment but not determining motion for 
contempt is not final); Haskins v. Haskins, 660 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) 
(order overruling motion to dismiss request to modify custody is not final); Koroshazi v. 
Koroshazi, 674 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (order reducing child support 
obligation but deferring custody issue is not final); Montecalvo v. Montecalvo, 710 N.E.2d 
379, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (order that parties undergo tests for purposes of resolving 
custody motion not final). 
171See, e.g., Hollis v. Hollis, 706 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (order 
disqualifying counsel from representing one of the parties to a divorce is final); Langer v. 
Langer, 704 N.E.2d 275, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (summary judgment in favor of husband as 
to wife’s entitlement to payments under antenuptial agreement found to be final). 
172743 N.E.2d 901(Ohio 2001). 
173Ms. Stevens’s son, Corey Banks, was killed in an automobile accident when the car, 
driven by Ms. Ackman, went left of center and collided with an oncoming vehicle.  The City 
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judgment asserting that it was entitled to statutory immunity.  Its motion was denied 
and the City appealed.  The Court of Appeals determined that it had jurisdiction over 
the case because the trial court’s order denying the City immunity affected a 
substantial right and was entered in a special proceeding (i.e. a wrongful death 
action).174  The Court went on to address the merits of the case, reversed the trial 
court and entered summary judgment in favor of the City on the issue of immunity.  
Finding its decision on the merits to be in conflict with another appellate district, the 
Court of Appeals certified the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for final review and 
determination.  The Supreme Court never reached the merits but found, instead, that 
the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to consider the matter in the first place.  In 
so doing, the Court decided that a wrongful death action was not a “special 
proceeding” for purposes of section 2505.02.175 
This decision overruled a large body of authority, which had come to the 
opposite conclusion.176  However, this was not the most troubling aspect of the case.  
In reviewing the majority opinion, it is possible to discern no less than three 
additional tests for determining when a “special proceeding” is involved.177  The first 
test applied by the Court was to determine whether a wrongful death action 
“provide[d] for a remedy to be sought through ‘an original application to a court for 
a judgment or an order’.”178  Though resolved in the negative, the Court was less than 
specific in explaining why this test was significant, how a wrongful death complaint 
was different from “an original application” or how a judgment for damages was 
different from the “judgment or order” referred to in its new test.  The second test 
applied by the Court was culled from dicta in an old Minnesota case and queried 
whether the action authorized “a special application to a court to enforce a right.”179  
Again, while answering this in the negative, the Court gave no insight as to how a 
wrongful death complaint authorized by section Chapter 2125 of the Ohio Revised 
Code differed from a “special application” as such a proceeding was envisioned by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court at the turn of the century.  Finally, the Court asked if a 
wrongful death claim provided “for what is essentially an independent judicial 
inquiry.”180  The Court again concluded that the answer was no, but did not explain 
                                                          
of Middletown was joined as a defendant because it allegedly failed to properly maintain the 
road on which the accident had occurred.  Id. at 902. 
174Stevens v. Ackman, No. CA99-03-0053, 1999 WL 125806 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 
1999). 
175Stevens, 743 N.E.2d 901, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 2001). 
176See, e.g., In re Estate of Pulford, 701 N.E.2d at 61; Uschold v. Cmty. Blood Ctr., 647 
N.E.2d at 817; Mazurek v. Hoover, No. 00CA50, 2001 WL 243233 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 28, 
2001; see also 1 OHIO JUR. 3D Actions § 126 (1998); MCCORMAC, WRONGFUL DEATH IN OHIO 
§ 101 (1982). 
177Though not entirely clear, these tests do not appear to be the same tests referred to in the 
aforementioned Polikoff dicta.  See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text. 
178Stevens, 743 N.E.2d at 906 (citing Missionary Society of M.E. Church v. Ely (discussed 
supra)). 
179Id. (citing Schuster v. Schuster, 87 N.W. 1014 (Minn. 1901). 
180Id. (citing In re Estate of Wykoff (discussed supra)). 
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what it meant by an “independent judicial inquiry” or how such an independent 
judicial inquiry was distinguishable from any other judicial inquiry in an action filed 
in a court of law.   
Not only did the Supreme Court appear to adopt these new tests, it also 
misapplied its own test from Polikoff as well as the standard set out in section 
2505.02(A)(2).  The Court held that a wrongful death action was nothing more than 
an “ordinary civil action seeking damages” which was “recognized at common law 
and hence was not a special proceeding.”181  There are several flaws to this 
reasoning.  First, the phrase “civil action” as used in special proceeding 
jurisprudence is a term of art and is not used in its literal sense.182  For instance, a 
federal civil rights claim is a civil action seeking damages but nobody would 
seriously consider that such a proceeding existed at common law or equity prior to 
1853.183  Second, it is the origin of the action and not the nature of the remedy that 
distinguishes a “special proceeding” from a non-special proceeding.  The fact that 
the litigant seeks monetary damages, over some other form of relief, should not be 
the dispositive factor.  Third, the Court contradicted its own prior case law in 
announcing that wrongful death was an action “recognized at common law.”184  Less 
than sixty years ago, in Sabol v. Pekoc, the Court noted that “[a]t common law there 
is no action for wrongful death.”185   
There was also obvious confusion on the part of the Court over the concepts of 
“common law” and “equity” as well as the fact that both the Polikoff syllabus and 
section 2505.02(A)(2) are phrased in the conjunctive.  The Court acknowledged that 
a wrongful death statute was first enacted in 1851.186  From there, however, the Court 
leapt to the conclusion that wrongful death was an “action at law” because the 
legislation pre-dated adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure by two years.187  This 
was a complete misapplication of the pertinent tests.  The standard set forth in 
Polikoff and section 2505.02(A)(2) asks whether the action was recognized at 
                                                                
181Id. 
182A “civil action” is usually thought of as including all actions other than criminal 
proceedings.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (5th ed. 1979).  However, in Watson & Co., 
the Supreme Court previously explained that it was using the term “civil action” to denote 
only those actions which did not exist at common law or equity prior to the adoption of the 
Code of Civil Procedure in 1853.  Watson & Co., 5 Ohio St. at 43-44. 
183See generally 14 OHIO JUR. 3D Civil Rights § 1 et seq. (1995) (detailing federal and state 
civil rights statutes imposing liability on those who the violate civil rights of another). 
184Stevens, 743 N.E.2d at 906. 
18576 N.E.2d 84, 87 (Ohio 1947); see also Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. 
Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629, 634 (Ohio 1874) (the cause of action given by the wrongful death 
statute “was not known at common law”).  Had the Court wanted to overrule these prior 
decisions, it should have done so explicitly rather than leave it to the bench and bar to try and 
reconcile them. 
186Stevens, 743 N.E.2d at 907. 
187Id. 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/4
2002-03] APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN OHIO 625 
common law or equity and whether it was specially created by statute.188  The 
common law consists of those rules and principles which derive their authority from 
“usages and customs of immemorial antiquity” or from courts recognizing, affirming 
and enforcing those usages and customs.189  At least one appellate court has defined 
the common law as all statutory and case law background of England and the 
American colonies before the revolution.190  Whichever definition one uses, it is 
manifestly obvious that a claim for wrongful death, codified in 1851, is not a part of 
the common law.  Moreover, even if it was, the special proceeding test is phrased in 
the conjunctive which is to say that an action must not only have existed at common 
law, but must also not have been specially created by statute.191  Even if all the 
aforementioned authorities were disregarded, and a wrongful death claim was 
considered a part of the common law, the fact remains that the proceeding was 
specially created by statute (as the Court acknowledged in its opinion) and was 
therefore a special proceeding. 
It is too early to tell what the precise effect will be from the Stevens decision.  
There is a temptation to simply limit the case to its syllabus192 and consider the 
opinion an anomaly that, hopefully, the Court will one day correct.193  Nevertheless, 
the decision is out there and the legal community should be aware that the Court may 
deviate again from strict compliance with its own standard for determining whether a 
given action is a special proceeding.  The better practice is still to approach this issue 
as called for both by the syllabus in Polikoff and by the standard set forth in section 
2505.02(A)(2) and inquire as to whether the proceeding can trace its origins back to 
common law or to equity.  If not, or if it was specially created by statute, then the 
action is a special proceeding and one can go on to determine whether the order at 
issue also affects a substantial right.194 
                                                                
188Polikoff, 616 N.E.2d 213, at paragraph one of the syllabus; OHIO REV. CODE 
§ 2505.02(A)(2) (special proceeding means an action that is specially created by statute and 
that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or equity). 
189BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250-251 (5th ed. 1979).  This is in contradistinction to 
statutory or legislative law.  Id. 
190In re Estate of Pulford,  701 N.E.2d at 60. 
191See Jetter v. Abbott, No. 17888 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 30, 2000) (unreported). 
192For cases decided prior to May, 2002, the syllabus of an Ohio Supreme Court decision 
stated the law of Ohio.  See former S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 1(B).  See also Williamson Heater Co. v. 
Radich, 190 N.E. 403, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1934); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 
Co. v. Baillie, 148 N.E. 233, at paragraph two of the syllabus (Ohio 1925).  Where the justice 
writing an opinion discussed matters, or gave expression to views not carried into the syllabus, 
it was merely the personal opinion of the justice and was dicta.  State ex rel. Donahey v. 
Edmondson, 105 N.E. 269, 270 (Ohio 1913).  Those observations or opinions were not 
generally binding on lower courts.  See State v. Boggs, 624 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ohio 1993); 
Ecker v. Cincinnati, 3 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936). 
193At least one court has continued to opine that wrongful death actions did not exist at 
common law - either unaware of Stevens or in defiance thereof.  See Kissinger v. Pavlus, No. 
01AP-1203, 2002 WL 1013085 (Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 2002). 
194OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(2).  The Supreme Court has characterized the test for 
determining finality as a two-step process with the first step being to determine whether the 
action is a special proceeding and, only after resolving that in the affirmative, does one 
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D.  Examples 
Again, time and space constraints do not allow for an exhaustive list of all the 
actions that have been determined to be (or not be) special proceedings.  However, a 
few examples shall follow.  A wrongful death action is not a special proceeding195 
and neither is an action in mandamus.196  Although crimes are statutory in nature, 
criminal prosecutions existed prior to 1853 and thus are not considered special 
proceedings.197  The Supreme Court has now made it abundantly clear that the 
process of discovery is not, in and of itself, a special proceeding and that discovery 
orders are typically not subject to immediate appeal.198  However, such orders may 
be appealable if entered in special proceedings199 or made as part of a summary 
application after judgment.200  Grand Jury proceedings existed at common law and, 
hence, are not special proceedings.201  Adoptions are special statutory proceedings 
that have no counterpart at common law.202  Actions in forcible entry and detainer are 
                                                          
proceed to the second step, which is determining whether a substantial right has been affected.  
Stevens, 743 N.E.2d at 905.  As a practical matter, though, it makes little difference which step 
is focused on first.  If both criteria are not satisfied, the judgment is not a final appealable 
order. 
195Stevens, 743 N.E.2d at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
196State ex rel. White, 684 N.E.2d at 74 (complaints for writs of mandamus were 
recognized at common law). 
197State v. Saadey, No. 99CO49, 2000 WL 1114519 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2000); State 
v. Serednesky, No. 99CA7, 1999 WL 1124763 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1999); State v. 
Branham, No. H-95-066, 1995 WL 704100 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1995). 
198Walters, 676 N.E.2d at 890; State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83, at 
paragraph seven of the syllabus (Ohio 1994). 
199The action in Walters was an “ordinary civil action,” 676 N.E.2d at 893, and the order 
at issue in Steckman was filed directly in a criminal case, 639 N.E.2d at 96, which is not a 
special proceeding.  See supra note 197 and accompanying text.  Given that neither Walters 
nor Steckman involved special proceedings per se, their holdings arguably do not apply to 
discovery orders that, in fact, do emanate from special proceedings.  This was precisely the 
conclusion reached by several appellate courts in cases that involved discovery orders in 
divorce proceedings.  See, e.g., Shoff v. Shoff, No. 95APF01-8, 1995 WL 353874 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Jul. 27, 1995); Whiteman v. Whiteman, No. CA94-12-229, 1995 WL 375848 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Jun. 26, 1995) (both of which distinguished Steckman).  Discovery orders in other sorts 
of special proceedings should, at least theoretically, still be appealable.  As a practical matter 
though, even if entered in a special proceeding, the discovery order must still affect a 
substantial right and this is where most litigants would run into difficulty.  In the vast majority 
of instances, it would be very difficult for litigants to show that they could not obtain effective 
relief from the discovery order on appeal after the case is concluded.  See supra notes 29-32 
and accompanying text.   
200See Kemper Sec., Inc. v. Schultz, 676 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
201In re Grand Jury, 667 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio 1996). 
202In re Adoption of Greer, 638 N.E.2d 999 (Ohio 1994). 
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special proceedings203 as are parentage actions.204  When dealing with actions not 
previously denoted by case law as a special or non-special proceeding, practitioners 
should carefully research the origins of the action to ascertain whether it existed at 
common law or equity prior to 1853 and whether it was specially created by statute.  
Consistent application of that standard, directed to the underlying action rather than 
the order being appealed, will go a long way to dispelling the Supreme Court’s past 
analytical errors and providing a more settled special proceeding jurisprudence. 
V.  ORDERS THAT VACATE OR SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT OR GRANT A NEW TRIAL 
The third category of final orders includes those that vacate or set aside a 
judgment or grant a new trial.205  If the Ohio Supreme Court’s special proceeding 
jurisprudence was characterized by its own internal conflicts and inconsistencies, 
then the Court’s rulings in this particular area are demonstrative of conflict with the 
General Assembly.  This category was first introduced to the statutory framework of 
final orders in 1937.206  Almost immediately, however, the legislation was struck 
down as unconstitutional insofar as it made judgments granting a new trial final and 
appealable.207  The Constitution was later amended208 and this provision was re-
enacted by the General Assembly.209  Once again, it was determined that an order 
granting a new trial did not constitute a “judgment” or “final order” and that the 
General Assembly had “no power or authority to provide for appeal of such 
order.”210  The Court inexplicably reversed itself several years later and stated that, in 
                                                                
203Colombo Enterprises, Inc. v. Fegan, No. 78041, 2001 WL 17555 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 
12, 2001); Bryant v. Dale, No. 98CA36, 1999 WL 731824 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 10, 1999); see 
also Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 423 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio 1981). 
204Sexton v. Conley, No. 99CA2655, 2000 WL 1137463 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2000); 
Mullins v. Roe, No. 97CA2518, 1998 WL 282974 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 1998). 
205OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(3). 
206See Am.H.B. No. 87, 117 Ohio Laws 615. 
207Hoffman v. Knollman, 20 N.E.2d 221, at paragraph four of the syllabus (Ohio 1939).  
From 1913 to 1945, Section 6, Article IV, Ohio Constitution, provided that courts of appeals 
only had appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases and “to review, affirm, modify or 
reverse . . . judgments . . .”  THOMAS R. SWISHER, OHIO CONSTITUTION HANDBOOK 579-580 
(1990).  The Court in Hoffman, 20 N.E.2d at 227, reasoned that an order granting a new trial 
did not come within the definition of a “judgment” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction 
because the very nature of the decision granting a new trial showed that nothing had been 
attained at that stage of the proceeding.  Thus, the Court reasoned, the granting of a motion for 
new trial was a “merely interlocutory step” in the progress toward finality and a judgment.  Id. 
208Effective January 1, 1945, Section 6, Article IV, Ohio Constitution, was amended to 
provide that the courts of appeals would have appellate jurisdiction “as may be provided by 
law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders….”  Swisher, 
supra note 207, at 579 (emphasis added).  This amendment gave the General Assembly power 
to change the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.  Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co. v. 
Youngstown, 70 N.E.2d 649, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1946). 
209H.B. No. 86, 122 Ohio Laws 754. 
210Green v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 N.E.2d 211, at paragraph four of the syllabus 
(Ohio 1951). 
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those instances where a verdict is returned for one party and the other party’s motion 
for new trial is sustained, there emerges from such sequence of events a final 
appealable order.211  These apparently inconsistent rulings were finally resolved in 
Price v. McCoy Sales & Service, Inc.212 wherein the Court held that the granting of a 
motion for new trial was a final order for purposes of section 2505.02.213  It is now 
well settled law that these orders are appealable.214  Although such appeals typically 
arise as a result of motions filed pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 59, they can also come 
about as a result of new trials ordered pursuant to other rules.215 
Orders that vacate, or set aside, a judgment had a slightly less tortured route to 
becoming final and appealable.  The Supreme Court ruled in Chandler & Taylor Co. 
v. Southern Pacific Co., that an order vacating a default judgment, upon motion of 
the defendant, filed at the same term, but more than three days after its rendition, was 
not a final determination of the rights of the parties and was not reviewable unless 
the court abused its discretion.216  It is important to keep in mind, though, that the 
legislature had not yet tried to make such orders appealable and the Court was 
merely construing the statute as it then existed in light of the order that was at issue 
in that case.  Subsequently, the Constitution was amended217 and legislation was 
passed218 to include such orders within the rubric of a final order.  Although 
Chandler & Taylor Co. was never expressly overruled, its holding was implicitly 
rejected by the Court in GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries, which held that 
an order setting aside a default judgment was a final order.219  Since that time, there 
has been no question that a judgment granting Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) relief is a final 
appealable order.220  By the same token, a judgment overruling an Ohio R. Civ. P. 
60(B) motion for relief is also final and appealable.221 
                                                                
211Gray v. Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co., 117 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ohio 1954).   
212Price v. McCoy Sales & Service, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio 1965). 
213Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus (overruling Green and approving Youngstown Mun. 
Ry. Co.). 
214Colvin v. Abbey’s Rest., Inc., 709 N.E.2d 1156, 1159 (Ohio 1999); see also State, ex 
rel. Roulhac, v. Probate Court, 255 N.E.2d 636, 637(Ohio 1970) (probate court order vacating 
judgment and ordering new trial is final and appealable); Mayo v. Hall, Cuyahoga App. No. 
41423 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1980) (unreported) (“[S]ince 1965, there has been no question 
that a lower court decision granting a new trial is appealable.”).  A trial court’s order granting 
the defendant a new trial in a criminal case is, likewise, a final order.  State v. Matthews, 691 
N.E.2d 1041, at the syllabus (Ohio 1998).  However, the State must seek leave to appeal 
pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.67(A). Id. at 1043. 
215New trial orders pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 49(B) are also final and appealable.  
Colvin, 709 N.E.2d at 1159.  Though the court of appeals is confined solely to ruling on the 
propriety of the order and cannot review any of the other claimed errors.  Id. at 1160. 
216135 N.E. 620, at paragraph two of the syllabus (Ohio 1922). 
217See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
218See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
219351 N.E.2d 113, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1976). 
220See, e.g., Bellamy v. Bellamy, 674 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Hopkins 
v. Quality Chevrolet, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 914, 916 n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Eads v. Spring, 529 
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VI.  ORDERS THAT GRANT OR DENY A PROVISIONAL REMEDY 
The fourth category of final orders, and the first of two new sections added by 
Sub.H.B.  No. 394, are those that grant or deny certain provisional remedies.222  A 
“provisional remedy” for purposes of section 2505.02 is defined as a proceeding 
ancillary to an action, including but not limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary 
injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, or suppression of evidence.223  
Not every order granting or denying a provisional remedy is a final order, however.  
The order granting that remedy must, in addition, satisfy both of the following 
requirements: 
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective 
remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, 
issues, claims and parties in the action.224 
Although Sub.H.B. No. 394 made other changes to section 2505.02, the primary 
impetus for the legislation was to allow for immediate appeals from these sorts of 
                                                          
N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).  These authorities are all based on the premise that 
the Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) order was entered with respect to a final judgment of the trial court.  
Orders granting or denying Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) relief from non-final, interlocutory, 
judgments are neither final nor appealable.  See Wolford v. Newark City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 596 N.E.2d 1085, 1086 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Wolf v. Associated Materials, No. 
00COA01350, 2000 WL. 1262540 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2000). 
221Colley v. Bazell, 416 N.E.2d 695, at paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1980). 
222See OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(4). 
223Id. at (A)(3).  Careful attention must be paid to the unusual wording of this provision.  
Generally speaking, a “proceeding” is the manner or process by which judicial business is 
conducted before a court.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (5th ed. 1979).  A remedy is the 
means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or 
compensated.  Id. at 1163.  A “provisional remedy” is a remedy provided for in a temporary 
process available in a civil action to secure against immediate loss, irreparable injury, etc. 
while the principal action is pending.  Id. at 1102.  By defining a “provisional remedy” as an 
“ancillary proceeding,” rather than the remedy awarded as part of that proceeding, the drafters 
of this legislation clearly mixed up the concepts of “proceeding” and “remedy.”  This error in 
drafting is even more pronounced when considering the preamble to Sub.H.B. No. 394, which 
explains that the purpose of the legislation is to specify circumstances under which an order 
granting or denying a provisional remedy is a final order.  This explanation treats the 
provisional remedy as an order not as the proceeding from which that order emanated.  The 
General Assembly may want to consider amending the statute so as to correct its mistake and 
define a provisional remedy as an order emanating from a proceeding ancillary to an action.  
In the meantime, as the Supreme Court has noted, it is a misnomer to refer to the order being 
appealed as the “provisional remedy.”  See State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ohio 
2001). 
224OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(4)(a)-(b). 
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judgments.225  This was in response to the harsh results associated with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Walters v. The Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc.226 as well as 
its explicit overruling of several lower appellate cases that allowed for immediate 
appeal of discovery orders concerning confidential information.227  The intent of the 
Judiciary Committee in passing this legislation was to carve out a niche for 
interlocutory orders having the potential for irreparable injury and adopt the Amato v. 
General Motors Corp. balancing test - weighing the expenditure of time and 
resources from an immediate appeal against the urgency of the need for review and 
the potential for irreversible harm.228  An excellent summary of these provisions, and 
the purpose behind them, can be found in the reasoning of the Fifth Appellate 
District in a case deciding that a ruling on a motion to change venue was not 
immediately appealable: 
The basic purpose of OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(A)(3) in categorizing 
certain types of preliminary decisions of a trial court as final, appealable 
orders is the protection of one party against irreparable harm by another 
party during the pendency of the litigation.…  The types of provisional 
remedies listed under 2505.02(A)(3) include decisions that, made 
preliminarily, could decide all or part of an action or make an ultimate 
decision on the merits meaningless or cause other irreparable harm.  For 
instance, a preliminary injunction could be issued against a high school 
football player preventing him from playing football his senior year based 
on recruiting violations.  The trial court could grant the attachment of 
property for which the owner has a ready buyer.  Discovery of privileged 
material could force a person to divulge highly personal or sensitive 
information.  If evidence critical to the prosecution of a criminal case is 
suppressed, the state could lose any meaningful chance at successful 
prosecution of a criminal.  The decision to deny a change of venue does 
not result in any of the types of irreparable harm just listed.  There is an 
                                                                
225See preamble to Sub. H.B. No. 394 declaring its purpose “[t]o amend Section 2505.02 
of the Revised Code to specify circumstances under which an order granting or denying a 
provisional remedy is a final appealable order . . . .”  See also the Witness Information Form 
completed by the Hon. Mike Fain prior to testifying before the Judiciary and Criminal Justice 
Committee of the General Assembly.  Judge Fain explained his support for Sub.H.B. No. 394 
because it would “permit appellate courts to provide meaningful appellate remedies to parties 
with meritorious appeals in certain cases where no meaningful remedy can be provided under 
existing law.”  The Seventh District Court of Appeals noted in Wilson v. Barnesville Hosp., 
Belmont App. No. 01-BA-40 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2001) (unreported), that the addition of 
the “provisional remedy” provision to OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02 was intended to prevent 
disclosure of confidential information. 
226676 N.E.2d at 894 (disallowing immediate appeal of an order permitting partial 
discovery of confidential child abuse reports). 
227See Niemann, 637 N.E.2d at 948 (order compelling production of psychiatric and 
counseling information over patient-physician privilege); Arnold, 639 N.E.2d at 489 (order 
compelling disclosure of identity of blood donor with HIV infected blood). 
228See Tribett v. Mestek, Inc., Jefferson App. No. 99 JE 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1999) 
(unreported).  The essentials of the Amato balancing test can now be found at OHIO REV. 
CODE § 2505.02(B)(4)(b). 
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adequate legal remedy from a decision denying a change of venue, after 
final judgment.  In other words, it may be expensive to get the cat back in 
the bag, if a trial court errs when it denies a change of venue, but it can be 
done.  Whereas, when the types of decisions listed in 2505.02(A)(3) are 
made, the cat is let out of the bag and can never be put back in.229 
Despite its vernacular, the “cat out of the bag” standard is the best gage by which 
to measure the potential for irreparable injury.  For instance, in Walters, if the trial 
court erred in allowing discovery of written documents pertaining to confidential 
child abuse reports, it would be impossible to restore that confidentiality in an appeal 
at the end of the case.230  The proverbial cat would be “out of the bag” at that point 
and could not be put back in.  Thus, the order would have been appealable under 
section 2505.02(B)(4).231  So too in Arnold where the plaintiff sought to discover the 
identity of a donor from whom he received blood infected with the HIV virus.  Ohio 
law generally prohibits disclosure of HIV test results.232  Once confidential 
information of that sort is disclosed, it cannot be undisclosed in a subsequent appeal.  
Consequently, an order requiring disclosure of such information should be 
appealable under section 2505.02(B)(4).233   
The Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the parameters of this new category of 
final appealable order in State v. Muncie.234  That case involved an interlocutory 
appeal of an order directing forced medication of a defendant in hopes of restoring 
his competency to stand trial.  The Twelfth District Court of Appeals dismissed the 
case for lack of a final order holding that the forced medication directive neither 
determined the action (i.e. the criminal case) nor arose in a special proceeding.235  
The Court went on to rule that the directive also did not grant or deny a provisional 
remedy because it was not in the nature of a preliminary injunction, discovery of 
privileged matter or suppression of evidence.236  A discretionary appeal to the 
Supreme Court was allowed for the sole purpose of determining whether the order 
was final and appealable.237  
                                                                
229Mansfield Family Rest. v. CGS Worldwide, Inc., No. 00-CA-3, 2000 WL 1886226 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2000) (citations omitted). 
230Walters, 676 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
231This is assuming (1) that the trial court’s judgment on a motion for protective order 
qualified as an ancillary proceeding under OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(A)(3) and (2) that the 
judgment, in effect, determined the action relative to such proceeding pursuant to OHIO REV. 
CODE § 2505.02 (B)(4)(a).  Both of these would seem to be safe assumptions to make. 
232Arnold, 639 N.E.2d at 490 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 3701.243). 
233Here again, the assumption is made that the court’s discovery order arose in an ancillary 
proceeding that essentially determined the action with respect to that proceeding. 
234746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001).  
235State v. Muncie, No. CA99-07-076, 2000 WL 342131 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2000). 
236Id. 
237State v. Muncie, 735 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio 2000).  The defendant was not allowed to 
challenge the order on substantive grounds. 
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The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the appeal holding that a 
judgment directing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was a 
final order under section 2505.02(B)(4).238  In so doing, the Court ruled that a 
judgment is final and appealable under the new statutory provision so long as it 
meets three requirements: (1) the order must grant or deny relief in a certain type of 
proceeding known as a “provisional remedy;” (2) the order must both determine the 
action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevent a judgment in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy; and (3) the reviewing court 
must decide that the party appealing from the order would not have a meaningful or 
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, 
claims and parties in the action.239 
Insofar as the first part of this test was concerned, the Court concluded that the 
appellate court took too restrictive a view of provisional remedies when noting that a 
forced medication order did not fall into the categories of a preliminary injunction, 
discovery of privileged matter or suppression of evidence.  The Court stated that the 
examples of provisional remedies set out in section 2505.02(A)(3) are non-
exhaustive.240  Indeed, the statute’s definition of a provisional remedy as any 
“proceeding ancillary” to an action necessitates that a wider array of proceedings be 
considered.  The Court noted that an ancillary proceeding is one that is attendant 
upon or aids another proceeding—one that is auxiliary or subordinate to the principal 
action.241  Given this broader definition, the Court reasoned that a proceeding seeking 
involuntary medication of a criminal defendant in hopes of restoring his competency 
to stand trial aids in the resolution of the criminal proceeding and is thus ancillary to 
that proceeding and qualifies for treatment as a provisional remedy.242  Turning to the 
second part of the test, the Court quickly noted that the order appealed determined 
the action against appellant with respect to the ancillary proceeding by directing that 
he be medicated against his will.243  The Court further held that the order prevented a 
judgment in favor of appellant with respect to that proceeding because it made no 
provision for him to make any future challenge to the administration or dose of 
medication being given to him.244  Finally, on the issue of whether appellant could be 
afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by appeal following final judgment on the 
criminal prosecution, the Court held that he could not.245  Much like the “cat out of 
the bag” colloquialism, the Court phrased the pertinent question as whether the 
                                                                
238Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1096, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
239Id. at 1097.  
240Id. at 1099. 
241Id. at 1100 (citing Bishop v. Dresser Indus., 730 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999) and Sorg v. Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc., No. E-98-057, 1998 WL 904945 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 17, 1998)). 
242Id. at 1100. 
243Muncie, 746 N.E.2d at 1100. 
244Id. at 1101. 
245Id. at 1101-02. 
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“proverbial bell” could be “unrung” in any future appeal.246  Involuntary medication 
is a highly intrusive procedure and violates very important liberty interests protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.247  The violation of those 
interests cannot be undone in a future appeal.  Further, as the Court noted, the drugs 
to which appellant was to be subjected carried the potential for severe or even fatal 
side effects, which also could not be undone in a future appeal.248  Given these 
factors, the Court concluded that the order compelling involuntary medication was 
one granting or denying a provisional remedy and was thus appealable under section 
2505.02(B)(4).249  The matter was remanded to the appellate court for a review of the 
order on its merits. 
The Muncie case notwithstanding, interlocutory appeals from orders which grant 
or deny provisional remedies are a relatively new occurrence in Ohio and it will be 
some time before there is a settled body of law on this issue.250  However, some 
expected trends have developed.  Orders granting discovery of privileged or 
confidential materials are now largely appealable251 though orders to produce such 
materials for in camera inspections by the court are not.252  Parties may appeal 
interlocutory orders compelling the disclosure of trade secrets during discovery,253 
                                                                
246Id. at 1101 (citing Gibson -Myers & Assocs. v. Pearce, No. 19358, 1999 WL 980562 
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1999), and Cuervo v. Snell, Nos. 99AP-1442, 99AP-1443 & 99AP-
1458, 2000 WL 1376510 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 26, 2000). 
247See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992). 
248Muncie, 746 N.E.2d at 1102.  
249Id. at 1092. 
250An example of the “unsettled” state of the law in this area is the disagreement between 
appellate districts over whether an order removing the executor of an estate is appealable as an 
order granting or denying a provisional remedy.  The Seventh and Tenth Districts have 
answered this question in the affirmative.  See In re Estate of Geanangel, 768 N.E.2d 1235, 
1239 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); In re Estate of Nardiello, No. 01AP-281 2001 WL 1327178 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2001).  Whereas the Sixth District has answered it in the negative.  See In re 
Estate of Gannett, Huron No. H-01-047 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2001) (unreported). 
251See, e.g., McPherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 766 N.E.2d 1015 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2001) (appeal allowed on denial of protective order without any discussion of the 
jurisdictional issue); Nester v. Lima Mem. Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2000); Wilson v. Barnesville Hosp., No. 01-BA-40, 2001 WL 1647298 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
21, 2001); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Hardgrove, No. 98AP-910, 1999 WL 224433 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 15, 1999).  This is not to say, however, that every discovery order concerning privileged 
or confidential material will automatically be considered a final order.  Nester, 745 N.E.2d at 
1157 (Walters, J., dissenting).  Appellants must also show that the requirements of OHIO REV. 
CODE § 2505.02(B)(4)(a)&(b) have been met. 
252See, e.g., Ingram v. Adena Health Sys., 761 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Gupta 
v. Lima News, 757 N.E.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).  The reason for this is 
intuitive.  Should the court examine the materials in camera and decide they should not be 
disclosed to the party requesting them, then nobody’s rights have been irreparably injured. 
253Gibson-Myers & Assoc., Inc. v. Pearce, No. 19358, 1999 WL 980562 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Oct. 27, 1999). 
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orders that disqualify counsel from representing them during the proceedings,254 
orders that impose monetary sanctions which are not stayed and can be collected 
immediately255 and orders enforcing a forum selection clause in a contract and 
transfer of a case to another state court.256  Summary judgment proceedings are not 
provisional remedies,257 nor are orders denying a stay of the case,258 or proceedings 
on a motion to dismiss a criminal prosecution on double jeopardy grounds.259  A 
judgment denying the State’s request to bind a juvenile offender over to adult court 
has been successfully appealed as an order denying a provisional remedy.260  
Although “suppression of evidence” was expressly included in the statute as a 
“provisional remedy,”261 several cases have held that judgments overruling motions 
to suppress evidence are not immediately appealable.262  The reasoning of these 
courts has been that the criminal defendants could still prevail at trial and, even if 
they did not, could still seek a stay of execution pending appeal.263  However, as one 
judge has aptly noted, the fact that the General Assembly included “suppression of 
evidence” under the new rubric of “provisional remedy” lends support to the 
argument that it intended to change existing law and make such rulings immediately 
appealable.264  The State could already appeal an adverse ruling on such a motion265 
and, thus, there would have been little reason to include this language in the 
amended statute unless the legislature intended to allow immediate appeals by 
                                                                
254Scaccia v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., Nos. 18435 & 18729, 2001 WL 1517043 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 30, 2001). 
255Pinnacle Tech. Res., Inc. v. Shafer Consulting Group, Inc., No. 00AP-1291, 2001 WL 
1117315 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2001). 
256Overhead, Inc. v. Standen Contracting, No. L-01-1397, 2002 WL 398342 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 11, 2002). 
257Bishop v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 730 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Tribett v. 
Mestek, Inc., No. 99 JE 1, 1999 WL 159216 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1999).  Ohio R. Civ. P. 
56(A)&(B) allow for summary judgment on claims, counterclaims and cross-claims which are 
the very nature of the proceeding and cannot be characterized as “ancillary” to the main 
action. 
258Meldrum v. Meldrum, No. L-02-1204, 2002 WL 1782225 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 22, 
2002). 
259State v. Hubbard, 734 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); State v. Prokos, No. 
00CA02, 2000 WL 714999 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2000). 
260In re Cline, No. 19082, 2002 WL 63794 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2002). 
261OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(A)(3). 
262State v. Ricciardi, 733 N.E.2d 291, 294-295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); State v. Lebron, No. 
99CA35, 1999 WL 1124762 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1999). 
263Ricciardi, 733 N.E.2d at 294-95, (citing State v. Smith, Portage App. No. 98-P-0116 
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1999) (unreported)). 
264Ricciardi, 733 N.E.2d at 295-96 (Cox, P.J., dissenting). 
265See OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.67(A); Ohio R. Crim. P. 12.  See also supra, notes 75-76, 
and accompanying text. 
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criminal defendants if their suppression motions were denied.  Some further 
clarification on this issue is obviously needed. 
All of these cases illustrate the paramount need to show danger of irreparable 
harm in order to have immediate review of the judgment being appealed.  The policy 
of this State has long been to discourage interlocutory appeals266 and section 
2505.02(B)(4) should be read in light of that policy.  Only in highly unusual 
circumstances, where irreparable damage will be done and cannot be undone once 
the case is resolved, should the appeal be allowed.  Appellate courts will 
undoubtedly be vigilant in making sure that this exception does not subsume the 
general rule against interlocutory appeals.  Practitioners must be clear in describing 
how their clients could not be afforded an effective or meaningful remedy if forced 
to wait to appeal the order until resolution of all issues, claims and proceedings in the 
action. 
VII.  ORDERS DETERMINING CLASS ACTION STATUS 
The fifth category of final orders, and the second new provision added by 
Sub.H.B.  No. 394, are orders that determine whether a case can be maintained as a 
class action.267  Prior to its statutory inclusion, this variety of orders also enjoyed a 
rather disparate treatment.  The Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the issue in 
Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.268 and held that orders denying class action 
status were final and appealable for purposes of section 2505.02.269  The Court 
analyzed the order under the first part of the statute, as it then existed, holding that 
such orders affected a substantial right and determined the action by foreclosing any 
judgment for, or against, the class.270  The Court also reasoned that the underlying 
purpose of section 2505.02 was to limit the number of appeals.  If class status was 
denied, the number of individual actions filed could approach the magnitude of the 
number of class members and possible appeals from those actions would far exceed 
any piecemeal appeals arising from a unified class action.  Thus, the Court believed 
judicial economy was better served at both the trial and appellate levels by making 
such determinations immediately appealable.271 
The Court came to a similar conclusion, albeit for different reasons, seven years 
later in Amato v. General Motors Corp.272  This time, the issue was whether an order 
granting class action status was also a final order.  The Court resolved that issue in 
                                                                
266See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
267See OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(5). 
268314 N.E.2d 386, at the syllabus (Ohio 1974). 
269Id. 
270Id. at 388. 
271Id. at 389.  This ruling was not unanimous.  Several justices noted that the order 
denying class status was “interlocutory inasmuch as it [did] not determine the action or 
prevent final judgment in plaintiff’s individual action.”  Id. at 391 (Corrigan & Brown, JJ., 
dissenting).  Though it was conceded that the order was tantamount to dismissing the action as 
to all other members of the proposed class, those members were not foreclosed from 
proceeding individually.  Roemisch, 314 N.E.2d at 391. 
272423 N.E.2d 452, at the syllabus (Ohio 1981). 
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the affirmative but, rather than analyze the order under the first part of section 
2505.02 as was done in Roemisch, the Court chose to consider the order as a “special 
proceeding.”273  The Court offered no explanation as to why a different portion of the 
statute was employed.  The Court simply applied the aforementioned “balancing 
test” and concluded that an order certifying a class action was made in a special 
proceeding and was a final appealable order.274 
Although analytically inconsistent with one another, Roemisch and Amato were 
both expressly affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Dayton Women’s Health Ctr. 
v. Enix.275  This case involved an action brought by workers at a women’s health 
clinic against a certified defendant class of protestors.  After class certification, the 
case proceeded on its merits to a final resolution at which time a permanent 
injunction was issued against the protestors.  The protestors appealed both the class 
certification and the remedy awarded against them.  The Court of Appeals modified 
and affirmed the permanent injunction but held that the class certification was a final 
order that should have been appealed within thirty days after it was rendered.  
Because an appeal was not taken, the Court ruled that the issue of class certification 
could no longer be reviewed.  The matter was then appealed to the Ohio Supreme 
Court, which affirmed citing both Roemisch and Amato for the proposition that class 
certifications were appealable orders and, thus, subject to the time limit provisions 
set forth in App. R. 4(A).276 
Once Amato was overruled, however, there was no longer any clear authority as 
to whether an order certifying a class action was still a final appealable order.  The 
issue came up again, post-Polikoff, in Chamberlain v. AK Steel Corp.277 and was 
answered in the negative.278  In that case, a group of steel workers sought, and were 
granted, plaintiff class status in a lawsuit against their employer for exposing them to 
asbestos in their place of employment.  AK Steel Corporation filed an immediate 
appeal of the class certification order but its case was dismissed for lack of a final 
appealable order.279  The Court acknowledged that Amato had been overruled and 
that the action brought by Chamberlain and the other members of the plaintiff class 
did not fall within the parameters of a “special proceeding” as defined by Polikoff.  
Thus, the question boiled down to whether Roemisch was controlling authority and 
whether an order granting class certification “determined the action” in the same way 
                                                                
273Id. at 455. 
274Id. at 456. 
275555 N.E.2d 956, at the syllabus (Ohio 1990). 
 
276Dayton Women’s Health Ctr., 555 N.E.2d at 958-59.  Subsequent to this decision, and 
in response thereto, Ohio R. App. P. 4 was amended to allow parties to appeal “partial final 
judgments” either immediately or at the end of the entire case.  See Ohio R. App. P.4, Staff 
Notes (1992). 
277696 N.E.2d 569 (Ohio 1998). 
278Id.  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is merely a one line summary affirmance 
of the appellate court decision.  Thus, all future citations to this case are to the Court of 
Appeals opinion. 
279Chamberlain v. AK Steel Corp., Butler App. No. CA97-04-074 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 20, 
1997) (unreported). 
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that an order denying such status.  The Twelfth District Court of Appeals answered 
that question in the negative.  Parroting the language used in Amato, the defendant, 
AK Steel Corporation, argued that “an order granting class certification similarly 
determined the action and prevented a judgment ‘because the economics of a class 
action are such that defendants are forced to settle the case in order to avoid the 
extraordinary expense of litigating a class action and the risk of a potentially 
bankrupting judgment on behalf of the class’.”280  The Court rejected that argument 
for the following reasons: 
It is undisputed that granting a motion for class certification will affect the 
trial tactics employed by the defendants and may be an incentive to settle.  
However, an order granting class certification does not have the effect of 
determining the action and preventing a judgment in favor of the 
defendants in the manner that an order denying class certification affects 
the plaintiff class.  While the defendants may be discouraged from 
continuing the action if a class is certified, the plaintiff class is absolutely 
precluded from continuing the action if certification is denied.  The Court 
therefore finds that an order granting class certification is fundamentally 
different from an order denying class certification with respect to 
designation as a final appealable order under OHIO REV. CODE § 
2505.02.281 
The appellate court thus dismissed the appeal282 which dismissal was later 
affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.283  The whole issue is now moot, of course, 
given that the General Assembly has expressly designated that judgments 
determining whether a case may be maintained as a class action are final appealable 
orders.284 
VIII.  MULTIPLE CLAIMS AND/OR MULTIPLE PARTIES 
Implicit in the discussion thus far has been the assumption that there are only two 
parties to the case in question and only one claim for relief.  The analytical process 
changes somewhat when there are multiple claims and/or multiple parties involved.  
Under those circumstances, the provisions of Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) must also be 
factored into determining whether an order is final and appealable.285  This rule 
provides as follows: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising 
out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are 




283Chamberlain, 696 N.E.2d at 569. 
284OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02(B)(5). 
285In re Berman, 590 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Gallucci v. Freshour, No. 
99CA22, 2000 WL 864977 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2000); McGuire v. Mills, No. 96CA2191, 
1997 WL 271731 (Ohio Ct. App. May, 21, 1997).  
43Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
638 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:595 
involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay.  In the absence of a determination that 
there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the right and liabilities of all the parties.286 
Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) is based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and provides for entry of 
final judgment against one party in a multi-party or multi-claim action while the 
action continues against the other parties.287  Historically, an appeal could not be 
taken until all claims and parties in an action had been resolved.288  Permitting only 
one appeal from an action was adequate at a time when most litigation involved only 
two parties and one claim.289  However, as joinder of parties and claims became more 
prevalent, it came to be accepted that denial of an immediate appeal from the 
disposition of an identifiable and severable portion of a complex action might result 
in an injustice.290  Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) was promulgated to make a reasonable 
accommodation of the policy against piecemeal appeals with the possible injustice 
sometimes created by the delay of appeals - a possibility rendered more likely by 
modern procedural rules allowing liberalized joinder of parties and claims.291  Now, 
where applicable, the provisions of Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) must be met in addition to 
the requirements of section 2505.02 in order for a judgment to be considered final 
and appealable.292 
There are several important points for courts and practitioners to keep in mind 
when confronted with multiple claims and Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B).  First, by its own 
language, the rule applies only to claims.  It does not apply to issues or remedies that 
are component parts of that claim.  Second, the order resolving that claim must still 
be final under section 2505.02.  The rule is not a means by which to circumvent the 
general prohibition against interlocutory appeals and cannot make appealable an 
order that is not final under the statute.  Finally, an appropriate finding of “no just 
reason for delay” is the sine qua non to immediate appealability.    Without such 
finding, the order is not final and the appeal must be dismissed.  Even with such a 
finding, the appellate court may determine that the finding was improper and dismiss 
the appeal anyway.  Each of these points is discussed in greater detail below. 
                                                                
286Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B). 
287See Staff Note. 
288Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Ohio 1989). 
289Id. 
290Id. 
291Id.  See also Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 359 N.E.2d 702, 703 (Ohio 1977). 
292State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 661 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ohio 1996); Chef 
Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 541 N.E.2d 64, at the syllabus (Ohio 1989).  
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/4
2002-03] APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN OHIO 639 
A.  Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) Applies Only to Claims 
By its express terms, Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) applies only where there is resolution 
of one or more but fewer than all claims in a multi-claim action.293  The rule does not 
apply where issues within a claim have been determined but other issues are left 
unresolved.  For instance, judgments that determine liability, but defer the issue of 
damages, are not final and Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) cannot be used to make them 
appealable.294  This is because damages are a remedy - part of the claim for relief - 
rather than a separate claim in and of itself.295  For the same reason, Ohio R. Civ. P. 
54(B) does not apply to procedural orders296 or to orders granting or denying a 
“provisional remedy” under section 2505.02(B)(4).297  None of these judgments 
determine an entire claim; they only resolve a component part of a claim.   
As noted previously, compliance problems with Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) arise most 
often in situations where the parties or the trial court lose track of all the competing 
claims, cross-claims and counterclaims and one or more of them are left 
inadvertently unresolved.298  In those cases, absent compliance with Ohio R. Civ. P. 
54(B), the judgment sought to be appealed will not be final and appealable.299  The 
one exception to this rule, where strict compliance with Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) is not 
necessary, arises in those instances where the claims remaining for adjudication are 
rendered moot by judgments already entered on other claims.300  Appellate courts 
                                                                
293The rule also applies where there are multiple parties but, because the presence of 
multiple parties inevitably means multiple claims, the discussion is limited to that issue for the 
sake of simplicity.  Nevertheless if claims by, or against, all parties in a case have not been 
resolved, then the trial court must include the appropriate Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) language to 
make the judgment appealable.   
294State ex rel. White, 684 N.E.2d at 74; State ex rel. A & D Ltd. P’ship v. Keefe, 671 
N.E.2d 13, 15-16 (Ohio 1996). 
295See Hitchings v. Weese, 674 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Ohio 1997) (Resnick, J., concurring); see 
also McKee v. Inabnitt, No. 01CA711, 2001 WL 1512031 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 26, 2001); 
Miller v. Biggers, No. 00CA2751, 2001 WL 1192123 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2001). 
296Colonial Mtg. Serv. Co. v. Habitat Assoc., Franklin App. No. 76AP-597 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 28, 1976) (unreported).  See, e.g., Owens Flooring Co. v. Hummel Constr. Co., 749 
N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) does not apply to orders 
denying stay of action pending arbitration); Kagy v. Toledo-Lucas County Port Auth., 699 
N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) does not apply to orders 
denying summary judgment). 
297Johnson v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, No. 80117, 2002 WL 472298 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2002); Premier Health Care Services, Inc. v. Schneiderman, No. 18795, 2001 WL 
1479241 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2001). 
298See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
299See, e.g., Karr v. JLH of Athens, Inc., No. 99CA57, 2000 WL 33226179 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 4, 2000). 
300See General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 266, 270-71 (Ohio 1989); 
Wise v. Gursky, 421 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ohio 1981). 
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will have jurisdiction in that event notwithstanding the absence of a finding of “no 
just reason for delay.”301 
B.  The Claim Appealed Must Still be Final Under Section 2505.02 
The corollary to the first rule, that Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) applies only to claims 
and not to issues or component parts of a claim, is that the entire claim must be 
resolved and be final under section 2505.02.  A finding of “no just reason for delay” 
pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) does not make appealable an otherwise non-
appealable order.302  Careful attention must therefore be paid to what constitutes a 
“claim.”  Over the years, intermediate appellate courts have given various definitions 
to “claim for relief” including “counts,” “issues,” “theories of entitlement,” “theories 
of relief,” “distinct branch of a case” or “demand.”303  These definitions were either 
wrong or too imprecise to provide a workable standard.  The Ohio Supreme Court 
gave a more precise definition in 1981 stating that a claim for relief, for purposes of 
Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B), was synonymous with a “cause of action.”304  A “cause of 
action” is that set of facts which establish or give rise to a “right of action,” the 
existence of which affords a party the right to judicial relief.305  “Cause of action” is 
to be distinguished from the “action” itself, which is a judicial proceeding brought in 
a court of law to vindicate the cause of action.306  These distinctions are critically 
important because an action (whether in the form of a complaint, cross-complaint or 
counter-complaint) may contain numerous “counts,” “theories,” or “demands” for 
relief but still encompass only a single “cause of action” or “claim for relief.”  For 
instance, where a person suffers personal injury and property damage as the result of 
a wrongful act, there is only a single “cause of action” even though the complaint 
asserts counts in battery and trespass.307  Summary judgment rendered on one of 
those counts, while the other count remains pending, would not be final and 
appealable even with a finding of “no just reason for delay.”  Consequently, before 
including the Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) language in an entry, trial courts should consider 
                                                                
301See, e.g., Nichols v. Arnold, No. 01CA9 2001 WL 1682939 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24, 
2001) (judgment in favor of plaintiffs rendered moot an unresolved counterclaim asserting that 
the complaint was frivolous); Ashbaugh v. Family Dollar Stores, No. 99CA11, 2000 WL 
146391 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2000) (judgment finding that store was not liable in slip and 
fall case rendered moot an unresolved subrogation claim). 
302McCabe/Marra Co. v. Dover, 652 N.E.2d 236, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Palmer v. 
Westmeyer, 549 N.E.2d 1202, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Douthitt v. Garrison, 444 N.E.2d 
1068, 1069-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). 
303Diane S. Leung, Note, The Application and Misapplication of Ohio Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(B), 39 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 237, 257-258 (1991). 
304Amato, 423 N.E.2d at 454. 
305State, ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 181 N.E.2d 31, at paragraph two of the syllabus (Ohio 
1962); Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co. v. Larwill, 93 N.E. 619, 621 (Ohio 1910). 
306See generally Baramore v. Washing, 160 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1959). 
307See Henderson v. Ryan, 233 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ohio 1968).  This so-called “factual unit 
theory” for defining a “claim for relief” is widely used in other states and federal courts and is 
the position taken by the Restatement of Judgments 2d.  Leung, supra note 303, at 259. 
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whether the partial judgment actually resolves an entire claim or just a particular 
count or theory of recovery advanced as part of that claim. 
C.  The Trial Court Must Find “No Just Reason for Delay” to  
Make the Order Appealable 
As stated above, a final judgment on one or more but fewer than all claims in a 
multi-claim action can be reviewed on appeal only after the trial court expressly 
determines that there is “no just reason for delay.”308  Unless a judgment contains 
that required phrase, the order is interlocutory, subject to future modification and is 
neither final nor appealable.309  Courts have been fairly stringent in requiring the 
precise language of that phrase to be used.  Anything less is deemed insufficient.310  
For instance, a trial court’s finding that an interlocutory order “shall constitute a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54" has been deemed insufficient to make an 
interlocutory order appealable under that rule.311 
Even if the “no just reason for delay” language is included in the judgment entry, 
this is still no guarantee that the order is appealable.  The Supreme Court made clear 
in Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co.312 that a trial court’s finding of “no just 
reason for delay” is essentially a factual determination that allowing an interlocutory 
appeal is “consistent with the interests of sound judicial administration.”313  As such, 
the court’s finding is reviewable by appellate courts just like any other factual 
finding.314  Where the record indicates that the interests of sound judicial 
administration could be served by a finding of “no just reason for delay,” the trial 
court’s determination must stand.315  However, where there is insufficient evidence to 
support that determination, appellate courts may reverse the Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) 
certification and dismiss the appeal.316  
                                                                
308Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B). 
309See 2 KLEIN & DARLING, CIVIL PRACTICE § 54-3 (1997).  See also Noble v. Colwell, 540 
N.E.2d 1381, 1385 (Ohio 1989); Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 543 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 
(Ohio 1989). 
310For example, the Fourth Appellate District has frequently referred to this as the “magic 
language” from Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B).  See, e.g., Cokonougher v. Loring, No. 99CA20, 2001 
WL 243274 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2001); Max J. Colvin & Sons Trucking. v. Phillip Diniaco 
& Sons, Inc., No. 87CA18, 1988 WL 85077 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 29, 1988); Rainsford v. Royal 
Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1294, 1987 WL 7584 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1987). 
311See, e.g., Mark-It Place Foods, Inc. v. New Plan Excel Realty Trust, Inc., Nos. 
01SC2816 & 2817, 2002 WL 1676323 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 15, 2002). 
312617 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 1993). 
313Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
314Id. at 1138. 
315Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
316The Supreme Court nevertheless made clear that, as with any other factual finding, trial 
courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness and appellate courts should not substitute 
their own judgment on the issue where there is some competent and credible evidence to 
support the trial court’s determination.  Id. at 1138. 
47Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
642 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:595 
Instances of appellate courts reversing trial court Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) 
certifications are rare, but they do exist.317  Trial courts should therefore exercise 
caution before certifying interlocutory orders as appealable under that rule.  A 
finding of “no just reason for delay” should not be made pro forma as “boilerplate” 
language in a judgment entry.318  There must be good reason for trial courts to ignore 
the general policy against piecemeal appeals and grant certification.319  Some have 
suggested that Ohio follow the lead of the federal courts and require trial courts to 
either explicitly set out in their judgment entries the reasons for making a Ohio R. 
Civ. P. 54(B) certification320 or at least consider the criteria adopted by federal courts 
when deciding whether to make a Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) certification.321  Those 
criteria are, among others: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and 
unadjudicated claims, (2) the possibility that the need for review may be mooted by 
future decisions in the trial court, (3) the possibility that a reviewing court might be 
forced to consider the same issue a second time, and (4) other considerations such as 
delay, economic oppression and solvency, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of 
competing claims and expense to the parties involved.322  The first option, that trial 
courts explain their reasons for making a Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) determination, would 
be burdensome to a system already straining against ever increasing workloads.  The 
second option, however, is eminently reasonable and trial courts should keep in mind 
the aforementioned federal criteria when determining whether to make a Ohio R. 
Civ. P. 54(B) certification.  Other states have already followed suit323 and, if trial 
courts are unwilling to engage in a deeper analysis of the issue, then appellate courts 
should step in and ensure that a finding of “no just reason for delay” is indeed 
supported by the evidence and consistent with state policy against piecemeal appeals.  
Interlocutory appeals should be the exception and not the general rule. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Appellate jurisdiction is an area of the law rarely given much thought until 
counsel has an appeal dismissed or a trial court has a case returned to it for lack of a 
final appealable order.  To avoid those situations, practitioners and trial court judges 
need a working knowledge of the jurisdictional requirements determining when 
                                                                
317See, e.g., Ranlom, Inc. v. Mikulic, No. C-971066, 1999 WL 49350 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
5, 1999) (Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) certification improvidently made); Bell Drilling & Prod. Co. 
v. Kilbarger Constr., Inc., No. 96CA23, 1997 WL 361025 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 26, 1997) (case 
involved “one of those rare occasions when the trial court’s [Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B)] 
certification is not justified.”). 
318Wisintainer, 617 N.E.2d at 1139. 
319See Leung, supra note 303, at 249. 
320Id. at 250 (citing Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 
(CA. Pa. 1975) (“A proper exercise of discretion under Rule 54(b) requires the district court to 
do more than just recite the 54(b) formula of ‘no just reason for delay.’  The court should 
clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant 54(b) certification.”) 
321Wisintainer, 617 N.E.2d at 1144 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
322Id. (citing Allis Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 364). 
323See, e.g., Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 424, 426 n.1 (N.D. 1995); 
Banks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 708 So. 2d 523, 525 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
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courts of appeals can hear cases.  Ohio appellate courts only have jurisdiction to 
review trial court judgments that are “final” orders as defined by section 2505.02 and 
comply with Ohio R. Civ. P. 54(B) where applicable.  These provisions should be 
construed, and applied, consistent with the important public policy interests against 
allowing piecemeal appeals.  More importantly, however, the Ohio Supreme Court 
needs to be more careful and consistent in its jurisprudence in this area.  This is 
particularly true in those cases dealing with “special proceedings” where the Court 
has frequently made pronouncements which are, at best, confusing and, at worst, 
analytically inconsistent with prior decisions.  Recent statutory amendments should 
clear up some of the confusion but practitioners and trial court judges need to be 
aware of pertinent case law to fully understand and properly apply those provisions.  
With careful and considered attention paid to section 2505.02 and Ohio R. Civ. P. 
54(B), appellate courts can avoid dismissing so many appeals for lack of jurisdiction 
and practitioners and trial courts will have greater certainty that, when a case is 
appealed, it will actually be decided on the merits rather than dismissed on what is 
often (albeit erroneously) considered a “technicality.” 
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